Related papers: Self-Mined Hardness for Safety Fine-Tuning

Large language models (LLMs) have seen widespread applications across various domains, yet remain vulnerable to adversarial prompt injections. While most existing research on jailbreak attacks and hallucination phenomena has focused…

Humans often become more self-aware under threat, yet can lose self-awareness when absorbed in a task; we hypothesize that language models exhibit environment-dependent \textit{evaluation awareness}. This raises concerns that models could…

Large language models (LLMs) are popular for high-quality text generation but can produce harmful content, even when aligned with human values through reinforcement learning. Adversarial prompts can bypass their safety measures. We propose…

Large Language Models have shown impressive generative capabilities across diverse tasks, but their safety remains a critical concern. Existing post-training alignment methods, such as SFT and RLHF, reduce harmful outputs yet leave LLMs…

The jailbreak attack can bypass the safety measures of a Large Language Model (LLM), generating harmful content. This misuse of LLM has led to negative societal consequences. Currently, there are two main approaches to address jailbreak…

The safety alignment of Language Models (LMs) is a critical concern, yet their integrity can be challenged by direct parameter manipulation attacks, such as those potentially induced by fault injection. As LMs are increasingly deployed…

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has been a critical concern requiring precise assessment. Current benchmarks primarily concentrate on single-turn dialogues or a single jailbreak attack method…

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become powerful tools for complex problem solving, but their structured reasoning pathways can lead to unsafe outputs when exposed to harmful prompts. Existing safety alignment methods reduce harmful…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being adopted in a wide range of real-world applications. Despite their impressive performance, recent studies have shown that LLMs are vulnerable to deliberately crafted adversarial prompts…

Safety risks of AI models have been widely studied at deployment time, such as jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful outputs. In contrast, safety risks emerging during training remain largely unexplored. Beyond explicit reward hacking that…

Jailbreaking is an emerging adversarial attack that bypasses the safety alignment deployed in off-the-shelf large language models (LLMs) and has evolved into multiple categories: human-based, optimization-based, generation-based, and the…

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has achieved remarkable performance across various tasks. However, research indicates that LLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where adversaries can induce the…

Large language models frequently fail to produce correct code on their first attempt, yet most benchmarks evaluate them in a single-shot setting. We investigate iterative self-repair (feeding execution errors back to the model for…

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit harmful or policy-violating outputs, while many existing defenses rely on expensive fine-tuning, intrusive prompt rewriting, or external guardrails that add…

This paper presents a systematic security assessment of four prominent Large Language Models (LLMs) against diverse adversarial attack vectors. We evaluate Phi-2, Llama-2-7B-Chat, GPT-3.5-Turbo, and GPT-4 across four distinct attack…

Despite substantial efforts in safety alignment, recent research indicates that Large Language Models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Among these attacks, finetuning-based ones that compromise LLMs' safety alignment…

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adaptive jailbreaks that easily bypass empirical defenses like GCG. We propose a framework for certifiable robustness that shifts safety guarantees from single-pass inference to the…

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash…

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities to jailbreaking attacks: carefully crafted malicious inputs intended to circumvent safety guardrails and elicit harmful responses. As such, we present AutoAdv, a novel…

Thinking mode has always been regarded as one of the most valuable modes in LLMs. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: LLMs with thinking mode are more easily broken by Jailbreak attack. We evaluate 9 LLMs…