Related papers: Fast Strategy Solving for the Informed Player in T…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We analyze best response dynamics for finding a Nash equilibrium of an infinite horizon zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic dynamic game (LQDG) with partial and asymmetric information. We derive explicit expressions for each player's best…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…
In this paper, we investigate distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) computation of monotone games with affine coupling constraints. Each player can only utilize its local objective function, local feasible set and a local block of…
In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…
The $N$-player quantum game is analyzed in the context of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment. In this setting, a player's strategies are not unitary transformations as in alternate quantum game-theoretic frameworks, but a classical…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
Many real-world domains contain multiple agents behaving strategically with probabilistic transitions and uncertain (potentially infinite) duration. Such settings can be modeled as stochastic games. While algorithms have been developed for…
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…
We prove that every finite two-person shortest path game, where the local cost of every move is positive for each player, has a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure stationary strategies, which can be computed in polynomial time. We also extend…
For the characterization of Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE) in linear quadratic games, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the discrete-time discounted coupled best-response equations for the scalar two-player setting, together with a…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…
This work considers a stochastic Nash game in which each player solves a parameterized stochastic optimization problem. In deterministic regimes, best-response schemes have been shown to be convergent under a suitable spectral property…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
The distributed computation of equilibria and optima has seen growing interest in a broad collection of networked problems. We consider the computation of equilibria of convex stochastic Nash games characterized by a possibly nonconvex…
Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…
This paper addresses the problem of distributed online generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) learning for multi-cluster games with delayed feedback information. Specifically, each agent in the game is assumed to be informed a sequence of local…
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…