Related papers: Tracing the Dynamics of Refusal: Exploiting Latent…

Attack Success Rate (ASR) evaluates each jailbreak with a single yes/no label at the end of generation, telling us whether a failure happened but not how it unfolded. Two attacks that produce equally harmful outputs may have followed…

Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal…

Refusal is a key safety behavior in aligned language models, yet the internal mechanisms driving refusals remain opaque. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic study of refusal in instruction-tuned LLMs using sparse autoencoders to identify…

Jailbreak attacks pose persistent threats to large language models (LLMs). Current safety alignment methods have attempted to address these issues, but they experience two significant limitations: insufficient safety alignment depth and…

Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts. Because we lack a robust understanding of why LLMs are susceptible to jailbreaks, future frontier models operating more…

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a…

Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations. Existing methods do so by ablating a refusal direction from model activations, aiming…

While modern LLMs are aligned to refuse harmful requests, it is essential to understand the underlying mechanistic basis of this refusal behavior for model safety analysis. For example, steering-based jailbreak attacks exploit this by…

In LLM-based text-to-SQL systems, unanswerable and underspecified user queries may generate not only incorrect text but also executable programs that yield misleading results or violate safety constraints, posing a major barrier to safe…

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Recent mechanistic studies have identified latent features and representation shifts associated with jailbreak success, but they leave a more fundamental question…

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, and single-layer defenses often trade security for usability. We present TRYLOCK, the first defense-in-depth architecture that combines four heterogeneous mechanisms across the…

In this paper, we investigate whether refusal behavior can be predicted from LLM intermediate activations before decoding using linear probes trained on residual stream activations at each transformer block. We find that refusal is linearly…

Jailbreak prompts can trigger harmful completions on aligned LLMs, In accordance, safety steering has been proposed: test-time activation interventions that steer jailbreak activations to trigger refusal while preserving benign utility.…

Safety-aligned language models systematically refuse harmful requests. While activation steering can modulate refusal, ablating the raw "refusal vector" calculated from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts often causes collateral damage…

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to optimization-based jailbreak attacks that exploit internal gradient structure. While Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) are widely used for interpretability, their robustness implications remain…

Efficient red-teaming method to uncover vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial. While recent attacks often use LLMs as optimizers, the discrete language space make gradient-based methods struggle. We introduce LARGO…

This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) approach for controlling adjustable metallic reflector arrays to enhance wireless signal reception in non-line-of-sight (NLOS) scenarios. Unlike conventional reconfigurable…

We introduce Refusal Steering, an inference-time method to exercise fine-grained control over Large Language Models refusal behaviour on politically sensitive topics without retraining. We replace fragile pattern-based refusal detection…

Recently, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated superior logical capabilities compared to traditional Large Language Models (LLMs), gaining significant attention. Despite their impressive performance, the potential for stronger…

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety constraints. Existing strategies, ranging from heuristic prompt engineering to computationally…