Related papers: When Safety Geometry Collapses: Fine-Tuning Vulner…

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) is a common practice to adapt generalist models to specialized domains. However, recent studies show that fine-tuning can erode safety alignment, causing LLMs to respond to harmful or unethical…

The emergence of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduces a new paradigm of explicit reasoning, enabling remarkable advances yet posing unique risks such as reasoning manipulation and information leakage. To mitigate these risks, current…

Emergent misalignment, where fine-tuning on narrow, non-harmful tasks induces harmful behaviors, poses a key challenge for AI safety in LLMs. Despite growing empirical evidence, its underlying mechanism remains unclear. To uncover the…

With rapid advancement and increasing accessibility of LLMs, fine-tuning aligned models has become a critical step for adapting them to real-world applications, which makes the safety of this fine-tuning process more important than ever.…

Fine-tuning is the primary mechanism for adapting foundation models to downstream tasks; however, standard approaches largely optimize task objectives in isolation and do not account for secondary yet critical alignment objectives (e.g.,…

Despite the intrinsic risk-awareness of Large Language Models (LLMs), current defenses often result in shallow safety alignment, rendering models vulnerable to disguised attacks (e.g., prefilling) while degrading utility. To bridge this…

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by…

In this technical report, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of a very recent method called "Geometry-aware Instance-reweighted Adversarial Training"[7]. GAIRAT reports state-of-the-art results on defenses to adversarial attacks on the…

Recently, major AI providers such as Google and OpenAI have introduced Finetuning-as-a-Service (FaaS), which allows users to customize Large Language Models (LLMs) using their own data. However, this service is vulnerable to safety…

LLMs(Large Language Models) nowadays have widespread adoption as a tool for solving issues across various domain/tasks. These models since are susceptible to produce harmful or toxic results, inference-time adversarial attacks, therefore…

Large language models are being deployed as mental health support agents at scale, yet only 16% of LLM-based chatbot interventions have undergone rigorous clinical efficacy testing, and simulations reveal psychological deterioration in over…

We introduce the Granite Guardian models, a suite of safeguards designed to provide risk detection for prompts and responses, enabling safe and responsible use in combination with any large language model (LLM). These models offer…

Instruction-following language models are trained to be helpful and safe, yet their safety behavior can deteriorate under benign fine-tuning and worsen under adversarial updates. Existing defenses often offer limited protection or force a…

Language models exhibit human-like cognitive vulnerabilities, such as emotional framing, that escape traditional behavioral alignment. We present CCS-7 (Cognitive Cybersecurity Suite), a taxonomy of seven vulnerabilities grounded in human…

Recent studies on the safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) have revealed that existing approaches often operate superficially, leaving models vulnerable to various adversarial attacks. Despite their significance, these studies…

Safety alignment is a key requirement for building reliable Artificial General Intelligence. Despite significant advances in safety alignment, we observe that minor latent shifts can still trigger unsafe responses in aligned models. We…

We identify a novel phenomenon in language models: benign fine-tuning of frontier models can lead to privacy collapse. We find that diverse, subtle patterns in training data can degrade contextual privacy, including optimisation for…

As AI agents move from chat interfaces to systems that read private data, call tools, and execute multi-step workflows, guardrails become a last line of defense against concrete deployment harms. In these settings, guardrail failures are no…

Model providers increasingly release open weights or allow users to fine-tune foundation models through APIs. Although these models are safety-aligned before release, their safeguards can often be removed by fine-tuning on harmful data.…

Hard-gated safety checkers often over-refuse and misalign with a vendor's model spec; prevailing taxonomies also neglect robustness and honesty, yielding safer-on-paper yet less useful systems. This work introduces Guardian-as-an-Advisor…