Related papers: Partition function form games with probabilistic b…

We introduce Value Coalition Logic, a typed assignment-based reconstruction of classical coalition logic. The strategic semantics is unchanged: coalitional ability is still interpreted by the standard one-step game-form clause. The change…

We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…

The Owen value is an well-known allocation rule for cooperative games with coalition structure.In this paper, we introduce the concept of highly mutually dependent unions. Two unions in a cooperative game with coalition structure are said…

Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…

Game theory formalizes certain interactions between physical particles or between living beings in biology, sociology, and economics, and quantifies the outcomes by payoffs. The prisoner's dilemma (PD) describes situations in which it is…

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…

We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of $j$ given losing coalitions into a set of $j$ winning coalitions.…

In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…

Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain…

This paper describes a basic model of a gift economy in the shape of a Giving Game and reveals the fundamental structure of such a game. Main result is that the game shows a community effect in that a small subgroup of players eventually…

In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical formulation for a specific form of collaborative industrial relations called "Industrial Symbiotic Relation (ISR) games" and provide a formal framework to model, verify, and support…

Inspired by the theory of poset games, we introduce a new compound of impartial combinatorial games and provide a complete analysis in the spirit of the Sprague-Grundy theory. Furthermore, we establish several substitution and reduction…

Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

When we work with information from multiple sources, the formalism each employs to handle uncertainty may not be uniform. In order to be able to combine these knowledge bases of different formats, we need to first establish a common basis…

Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…

It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that…

In this paper we will be examining impartial scoring play games. We first give the basic definitions for what impartial scoring play games are and look at their general structure under the disjunctive sum. We will then examine the game of…