Related papers: Many-to-many stable matching in large economies
For a many-to-one matching model, we study the matchings obtained through the restabilization of stable matchings that had been disrupted by a change in the population. We include a simple representation of the stable matching obtained in…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we first show that the sets of firm-quasi-stable and…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuitive binary operations to compute the least upper bound and…
We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution…
Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
This paper analyzes stochastic networks consisting of a set of finite capacity sites where different classes of individuals move according to some routing policy. The associated Markov jump processes are analyzed under a thermodynamic limit…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…