Related papers: Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver is a `conservative Bayesian' whose updated belief is a convex combination of the prior and the correct Bayesian posterior. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information…
The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to…
I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for choosing Sender's preferred action, and Sender has maxmin preferences over all Receiver type distributions with known mean and bounds. This…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this…
We present a general framework for evolutionary learning to emergent unbiased state representation without any supervision. Evolutionary frameworks such as self-play converge to bad local optima in case of multi-agent reinforcement learning…
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…
This paper develops a data-driven approach to Bayesian persuasion. The receiver is privately informed about the prior distribution of the state of the world, the sender knows the receiver's preferences but does not know the distribution of…
In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…
This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…
This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…
In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the…
In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. We focus on \emph{acknowledgment-based} protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she…
We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…
A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…