Related papers: Profiling Resilient to Change in Probe Position
Electromagnetic (EM) shielding is widely used to suppress radiated emissions and limit passive EM side-channel leakage. However, shielding does not address active probing, where an adversary injects external radio-frequency (RF) signals and…
During the last decade, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have progressively been integrated on all types of platforms, from data centers to embedded systems including low-power processors and, recently, FPGAs. Neural Networks (NN) are expected to…
Power side-channel attacks exploit the dynamic power consumption of cryptographic operations to leak sensitive information of encryption hardware. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct power side-channel analysis for assessing the…
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…
Existing power analysis techniques rely on strong adversary models with prior knowledge of the leakage or training data. We introduce side-channel analysis with unsupervised learning (SCAUL) that can recover the secret key without requiring…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
With increasingly sophisticated cyber-adversaries able to access a wider repertoire of mechanisms to implant malware such as ransomware, CPU/GPU keyloggers, and stealthy kernel rootkits, there is an urgent need for techniques to detect and…
This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during…
This paper proposes an upgraded electro-magnetic side-channel attack that automatically reconstructs the intercepted data. A novel system is introduced, running in parallel with leakage signal interception and catching compromising data in…
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such…
Supervised deep learning has emerged as an effective tool for carrying out power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. While increasingly-powerful deep learning-based attacks are regularly published, comparatively-little…
This paper proposes the use of iterative transfer learning applied to deep learning models for side-channel attacks. Currently, most of the side-channel attack methods train a model for each individual byte, without considering the…
We study a sequential coherent side-channel model in which an adversarial probe qubit interacts with a target qubit during a hidden gate sequence. Repeating the same hidden sequence for $N$ shots yields an empirical full-correlation record:…
In recent years a new class of side-channel attacks has emerged. Instead of targeting device emissions during dynamic computation, adversaries now frequently exploit the leakage or response behaviour of integrated circuits in a static…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
Electronic devices and cables inadvertently emit RF emissions as a byproduct of signal processing and/or transmission. Labeled as electromagnetic emanations, they form an EM side-channel for data leakage. Previously, it was believed that…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…
Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…
Machine learning has become mainstream across industries. Numerous examples proved the validity of it for security applications. In this work, we investigate how to reverse engineer a neural network by using only power side-channel…
Spin Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is a promising candidate for Last Level Cache (LLC) due to high endurance, high density and low leakage. One of the major disadvantages of STTRAM is high write latency and write current. Additionally, the…