Related papers: Optimal incentive scheme for ESG disclosure
We study the power of price discrimination via an intermediary in bilateral trade, when there is a revenue-maximizing seller selling an item to a buyer with a private value drawn from a prior. Between the seller and the buyer, there is an…
This paper considers the optimal portfolio selection problem in a dynamic multi-period stochastic framework with regime switching. The risk preferences are of exponential (CARA) type with an absolute coefficient of risk aversion which…
In this work we study the individual strategies carried out by agents undergoing transactions in wealth exchange models. We analyze the role of risk propensity in the behavior of the agents and find a critical risk, such that agents with…
We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This…
We investigate the impact of a regulation policy imposed on an agent exploiting a possibly renewable natural resource. We adopt a principal-agent model in which the Principal looks for a contract, i.e. taxes/compensations, leading the Agent…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
We study the problem of dynamically trading futures in a regime-switching market. Modeling the underlying asset price as a Markov-modulated diffusion process, we present a utility maximization approach to determine the optimal futures…
In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical principal-agent problem in a setting where the agent can be of one…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…
Throughout this paper, we focused our aim on the problem of optimal control under a risk-sensitive performance functional, where the system is given by a fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equation with jump. The risk…
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart of our model is a reward function, which maps the agent…
We study a dynamic asset pricing problem in which a representative agent is ambiguous about the aggregate endowment growth rate and trades a risky stock, human capital, and a risk-free asset to maximize her preference value of consumption…
In the on-line Explore and Exploit literature, central to Machine Learning, a central planner is faced with a set of alternatives, each yielding some unknown reward. The planner's goal is to learn the optimal alternative as soon as…
In this article we introduce a portfolio optimisation framework, in which the use of rough path signatures (Lyons, 1998) provides a novel method of incorporating path-dependencies in the joint signal-asset dynamics, naturally extending…
We consider a class of generalized capital asset pricing models in continuous time with a finite number of agents and tradable securities. The securities may not be sufficient to span all sources of uncertainty. If the agents have…
We study a problem of optimal allocation in a discrete-time multi-period pure-exchange economy, where agents have preferences over stochastic endowment processes that are represented by strongly time-consistent dynamic risk measures. We…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. The presence of ties…