Related papers: Optimal incentive scheme for ESG disclosure
In this paper we show how the relaxation techniques can be used to establish the existence of an optimal contract in presence of information asymmetry. The method we illustrate was initially motivated by the problem of designing optimal…
We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…
What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
We study the optimal contract problem in the \emph{combinatorial actions} framework of D\"utting et al.~[FOCS'21], where a principal delegates a project to an agent who chooses a subset of hidden, costly actions, and the resulting reward is…
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead…
We study a robust contract design problem with deferred inspection, in which a principal allocates a scarce resource to an agent, observes the agent's realized outcome ex post at negligible cost, and conditions transfers on this information…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
Strategic learning studies how decision rules interact with agents who may strategically change their inputs/features to achieve better outcomes. In standard settings, models assume that the decision-maker's sole scope is to learn a…
We consider two market designs for a network of prosumers, trading energy: (i) a centralized design which acts as a benchmark, and (ii) a peer-to-peer market design. High renewable energy penetration requires that the energy market design…
We introduce a two-agent problem which is inspired by price asymmetry arising from funding difference. When two parties have different funding rates, the two parties deduce different fair prices for derivative contracts even under the same…
We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…
A monopoly platform sells either a risky product (with unknown utility) or a safe product (with known utility) to agents who sequentially arrive and learn the utility of the risky product by the reporting of previous agents. It is costly…
We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a Principal-Agent approach. The Principal represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of…
The development of renewable energy generation empowers microgrids to generate electricity to supply itself and to trade the surplus on energy markets. To minimize the overall cost, a microgrid must determine how to schedule its energy…
The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…
Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such…
Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…
The question of pricing and hedging a given contingent claim has a unique solution in a complete market framework. When some incompleteness is introduced, the problem becomes however more difficult. Several approaches have been adopted in…