Related papers: Stackelberg Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Differenti…
Linear-quadratic optimal control problems are considered for mean-field stochastic differential equations with deterministic coefficients. Time-inconsistency feature of the problems is carefully investigated. Both open-loop and closed-loop…
In this paper, we propose a novel equilibrium solution notion for the time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem. This notion is called the mixed equilibrium solution, which consists of two parts: a…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
In this paper, the solvability of discrete-time stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem in finite horizon is considered. Firstly, it shows that the closed-loop solvability for the LQ control problem is optimal if and only…
This paper investigates a stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ, for short) control problem regulated by a time-invariant Markov chain in infinite horizon. Under the $L^2$-stability framework, we study a class of linear backward stochastic…
Motivated by a product pricing problem, a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game for a regime switching system involving one leader and two followers is studied. The two followers engage in a zero-sum differential game, and both the…
Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…
The paper deals with a class of time-inconsistent control problems for McKean-Vlasov dynamics. By solving a backward time-inconsistent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for short) equation coupled with a forward distribution-dependent stochastic…
We study the time-inconsistent linear quadratic optimal control problem for forward-backward stochastic differential equations with potentially indefinite cost weighting matrices for both the state and the control variables. Our research…
This paper is concerned with a three-level stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information, in which three players participate credited as Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3. Player 3 acts as the leader of…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
This paper is concerned with the open-loop time-consistent solution of time-inconsistent mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control. Different from standard stochastic linear-quadratic problems, both the system matrices and the…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…
This paper is concerned with stochastic linear quadratic (LQ, for short) optimal control problems in an infinite horizon with conditional mean-field term in a switching regime environment. The orthogonal decomposition introduced in [21] has…
This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…
Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…
This paper investigates a two-person non-homogeneous linear-quadratic stochastic differential game (LQ-SDG, for short) in an infinite horizon for a system regulated by a time-invariant Markov chain. Both non-zero-sum and zero-sum LQ-SDG…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…
This paper investigates an inhomogeneous non-zero-sum linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential game problem whose state process and cost functional are regulated by a Markov chain. Under the $L^2$ stabilizability framework, we first…