Related papers: Liquidity provision in CLMMs: evidence from transa…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a central component of decentralized exchanges, yet their equilibrium foundations and microeconomic mechanisms remain incompletely understood. This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium framework for…
Decentralized exchanges (DEXes) have introduced an innovative trading mechanism, where it is not necessary to match buy-orders and sell-orders to execute a trade. DEXes execute each trade individually, and the exchange rate is automatically…
Passive liquidity providers (LPs) in automated market makers (AMMs) face losses due to adverse selection (LVR), which static trading fees often fail to offset in practice. We study the key determinants of LP profitability in a dynamic…
We study Just-in-time (JIT) liquidity provision in blockchain-based decentralized exchanges. A JIT liquidity provider (LP) monitors pending swap orders in public mempools of blockchains to sandwich orders of their choice with liquidity,…
The recently proposed Uniswap v3 replaces the fungible liquidity provider token (LP token) into non-fungible ones, making the design for liquidity mining more difficult. In this paper, we propose a flexible liquidity mining scheme that…
Trade execution on Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) is automatic and does not require individual buy and sell orders to be matched. Instead, liquidity aggregated in pools from individual liquidity providers enables trading between…
Geometric mean market makers (G3Ms), such as Uniswap and Balancer, comprise a popular class of automated market makers (AMMs) defined by the following rule: the reserves of the AMM before and after each trade must have the same (weighted)…
The limit order book mechanism has been the core trading mechanism of the modern financial market. In the cryptocurrency market, centralized exchanges also adopt this limit order book mechanism and a centralized matching engine dynamically…
The trustless nature of permissionless blockchains renders overcollateralization a key safety component relied upon by decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. Nonetheless, factors such as price volatility may undermine this mechanism. In…
Decentralized perpetuals protocols have collectively reached billions of dollars of daily trading volume, yet are still not serious competitors on the basis of trading volume with centralized venues such as Binance. One of the main reasons…
In this paper we analyze constant product market makers (CPMMs). We formalize the liquidity providers' profitability conditions and introduce a concept we call the profitability frontier in the xyk-space. We study the effect of mint and…
This work analytically characterizes impermanent loss for automated market makers (AMMs) in decentralized markets such as Uniswap or Balancer (CPMM). We derive a static replication formula for the pool's value using a combination of…
In Decentralized Finance (DeFi), automated market makers typically implement liquidity provisioning protocols. These protocols allow third-party liquidity providers (LPs) to provide assets to facilitate trade in exchange for fees. This…
The growth of e-commerce has created increasing complexity in logistics services. To remain competitive, logistics and e-commerce companies are exploring new modes as supplements to traditional home delivery, one of which is the…
Constant function market makers(CFMMS) are a popular market design for decentralized exchanges(DEX). Liquidity providers(LPs) supply the CFMMs with assets to enable trades. In exchange for providing this liquidity, an LP receives a token…
In decentralized finance, any individual can pool their assets into an automated market maker (AMM) -- herein we focus on the constant product market maker (CPMM) -- in exchange for a claim on a fraction of future pool assets and fees…
Liquidity providers are essential for the function of decentralized exchanges to ensure liquidity takers can be guaranteed a counterparty for their trades. However, liquidity providers investing in liquidity pools face many risks, the most…
Concentrated-liquidity automated market makers (CLAMMs), as exemplified by Uniswap v3, are now a common primitive in decentralized finance frameworks. Their design combines continuous trading on constant-function curves with discrete tick…
Automated market makers (AMMs) allocate fee revenue \textit{proportional} to the amount of liquidity investors deposit. In this paper, we study the economic consequences of the competition between passive liquidity providers (LPs) caused by…
We suggest a framework to determine optimal trading fees for constant function market makers (CFMMs) in order to maximize liquidity provider returns. In a setting of multiple competing liquidity pools, we show that no race to the bottom…