Related papers: A Stackelberg Model for Hybridization in Cryptogra…

The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker.…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

Interdicting a criminal with limited police resources is a challenging task as the criminal changes location over time. The size of the large transportation network further adds to the difficulty of this scenario. To tackle this issue, we…

Data injection attacks have recently emerged as a significant threat on the smart power grid. By launching data injection attacks, an adversary can manipulate the real-time locational marginal prices to obtain economic benefits. Despite the…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg…

Choosing a hard-to-guess secret is a prerequisite in many security applications. Whether it is a password for user authentication or a secret key for a cryptographic primitive, picking it requires the user to trade-off usability costs with…

In this paper, we first consider a pinning node selection and control gain co-design problem for complex networks. A necessary and sufficient condition for the synchronization of the pinning controlled networks at a homogeneous state is…

The rapid expansion of Internet use has increased system exposure to cyber threats, with advanced persistent threats (APTs) being especially challenging due to their stealth, prolonged duration, and multi-stage attacks targeting high-value…

Cyber deception is an emerging proactive defense strategy to counter increasingly sophisticated attacks such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) by misleading and distracting attackers from critical assets. However, since deception…

Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to…

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…

Malware attacks are costly. To mitigate against such attacks, organizations deploy malware detection tools that help them detect and eventually resolve those threats. While running only the best available tool does not provide enough…

This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each…

Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…

This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack…

We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after…

This paper studies the problem of multi-step manipulative attacks in Stackelberg security games, in which a clever attacker attempts to orchestrate its attacks over multiple time steps to mislead the defender's learning of the attacker's…

While social networks are widely used as a media for information diffusion, attackers can also strategically employ analytical tools, such as influence maximization, to maximize the spread of adversarial content through the networks. We…

Currently the Dempster-Shafer based algorithm and Uniform Random Probability based algorithm are the preferred method of resolving security games, in which defenders are able to identify attackers and only strategy remained ambiguous.…