Related papers: Forward-looking evolutionary game dynamics subject…

Most research on adaptive decision-making takes a strategy-first approach, proposing a method of solving a problem and then examining whether it can be implemented in the brain and in what environments it succeeds. We present a method for…

Eco-evolutionary game dynamics which characterizes the mutual interactions and the coupled evolutions of strategies and environments has been of growing interests in very recent years. Since such feedback loops widely exist in a range of…

We study evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations, subject to fluctuating environments. The population undergoes a birth-death process with absorbing states, and the environment follows a Markovian process, resulting in a…

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…

Environmental changes play a critical role in determining the evolution of social dilemmas in many natural or social systems. Generally, the environmental changes include two prominent aspects: the global time-dependent fluctuations and the…

We study the existence of classical solutions to a broad class of local, first order, forward-backward Extended Mean Field Games systems, that includes standard Mean Field Games, Mean Field Games with congestion, and mean field type control…

Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows to introduce elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase…

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provides a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call {\sigma} law,…

This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…

Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…

In this study, we develop a novel evolutionary model that incorporates Mendelian genetics, continuous strategies, and the potential for multiple genes to contribute to a single phenotypic trait. The evolution of altruistic behavior, which…

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…

The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…

This article introduces a novel mean-field game model for multi-sector economic growth in which a dynamically evolving externality, influenced by the collective actions of agents, plays a central role. Building on classical growth theories…

Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…

Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…

This work introduces an online Bayesian game-theoretic method for behavior identification in multi-agent dynamical systems. By casting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman optimality conditions as linear-in-parameter residuals, the method enables fast…

Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…

This paper considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion where agents want to leave a given bounded domain through a part of its boundary in minimal time. Each agent is free to move in any direction, but their maximal speed is…