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The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has intensified concerns about manipulative or deceptive behaviors that can undermine user autonomy, trust, and well-being. Existing safety benchmarks predominantly rely on coarse binary…
Recent advances in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) facilitate a new class of embodied AI systems, where these models are integrated into physical platforms, e.g. robots and autonomous vehicles, to interpret visual scenes and execute natural…
Web agents, powered by large language models (LLMs), are increasingly deployed to automate complex web interactions. The rise of open-source frameworks (e.g., Browser Use, Skyvern-AI) has accelerated adoption, but also broadened the attack…
AI agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously in the world, yet there is still no reliable way to trace a harmful agent back to the account that deployed it. This creates the same accountability gap across both ends of the intent…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as tool-using agents, shifting safety concerns from harmful text generation to harmful task completion. Deployed systems often condition on user profiles or persistent memory, yet agent…
AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We…
We argue that LLM agent security is fundamentally an agent-human interaction (AHI) problem, not a purely algorithmic one. To substantiate this position, we conduct a systematic analysis of 59 academic papers, 21 production agent systems,…
Agent Skills, structured packages of procedural knowledge loaded into an LLM agent at inference time, are widely reported to improve task pass rates by an average of 16.2~percentage points across diverse domains. Yet the same benchmarks…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly integrated into computer-use agents, which can autonomously operate tools on a user's computer to accomplish complex tasks. However, due to the inherently unstable and unpredictable nature…
Autonomous AI agents deployed on platforms such as OpenClaw face prompt injection, memory poisoning, supply-chain attacks, and social engineering, yet existing defences address only the platform perimeter, leaving the agent's own threat…
Large Language Model (LLM) agents offer a powerful new paradigm for solving various problems by combining natural language reasoning with the execution of external tools. However, their dynamic and non-transparent behavior introduces…
AI character platforms, which allow users to engage in conversations with AI personas, are a rapidly growing application domain. However, their immersive and personalized nature, combined with technical vulnerabilities, raises significant…
Traditional cybersecurity methodologies target deterministic systems and fail to address the probabilistic nature of AI, leaving systems vulnerable to attack vectors such as model inversion, data poisoning, and prompt injection. Recent…
AI agents, predominantly powered by large language models (LLMs), are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, in which malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data can trigger dangerous agent actions. This position paper discusses our…
Modern software infrastructure increasingly relies on LLM agents for development and maintenance, such as Claude Code and Gemini-cli. However, these AI agents differ fundamentally from traditional deterministic software, posing a…
We stress-tested 16 leading models from multiple developers in hypothetical corporate environments to identify potentially risky agentic behaviors before they cause real harm. In the scenarios, we allowed models to autonomously send emails…
Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to…
Background. Traditional safety benchmarks for language models evaluate generated text: whether a model outputs toxic language, reproduces bias, or follows harmful instructions. When models are deployed as agents, the safety-relevant object…
OpenClaw's ClawHub marketplace hosts tens of thousands of community-contributed agent skills (49,592 in our 2026-04-04 snapshot), and recent audits report that 13-26% contain security vulnerabilities. Regex scanners miss obfuscated…
To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large…