Related papers: Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment
We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that…
We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…
We study the problem of finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on the fairness notion of envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). A central open question in fair division is whether…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting in which an agent's utility may decrease or increase when an item is allocated. We take the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and present stronger…
In the fair division of items among interested agents, envy-freeness is possibly the most favoured and widely studied formalisation of fairness. For indivisible items, envy-free allocations may not exist in trivial cases, and hence research…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items with subsidies when agents have weighted entitlements. After highlighting several important differences from the unweighted case, we present several results concerning weighted…
This paper explores the problem of fair assignment on Multi-Stage graphs. A multi-stage graph consists of nodes partitioned into $K$ disjoint sets (stages) structured as a sequence of weighted bipartite graphs formed across adjacent stages.…
In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…
Envy-Freeness is one of the most fundamental and important concepts in fair allocation. Some recent studies have focused on the concept of weighted envy-freeness. Under this concept, each agent is assigned a weight, and their valuations are…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
Fair division is the problem of allocating a set of items among agents in a fair manner. One of the most sought-after fairness notions is envy-freeness (EF), requiring that no agent envies another's allocation. When items are indivisible,…
We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We study the efficiency of fair allocations using the well-studied price of fairness concept, which quantitatively measures the worst-case efficiency loss when imposing fairness constraints. Previous works provided partial results on the…
The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods,…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of…
We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to…
Envy-freeness is one of the most prominent fairness concepts in the allocation of indivisible goods. Even though trivial envy-free allocations always exist, rich literature shows this is not true when one additionally requires some…