Related papers: Strategic Facility Location with Limited Liars

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…

We study one-shot Nash competition between an arbitrary number of identical dealers that compete for the order flow of a client. The client trades either because of proprietary information, exposure to idiosyncratic risk, or a mix of both…

We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study…

We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…

We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function…

In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users…

We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…

We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…

We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (epsilon-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It…

We study a truthful facility location problem where one out of $k\geq2$ available facilities must be built at a location chosen from a set of candidate ones in the interval $[0,1]$. This decision aims to accommodate a set of agents with…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study $k$-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to…

Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a widely employed method for pricing electricity in the wholesale electricity market. Although it is well known that the LMP mechanism is vulnerable to market manipulation, there is little literature…

We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…

In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player's payoff is the number of customers assigned to it.…

This paper addresses the problem of locating base stations in a certain area which is highly populated by mobile stations; each mobile station is assumed to select the closest base station. Base stations are modeled by players who choose…

We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…