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We consider a monopoly insurance market with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing insurer and a consumer with Yaari Dual Utility preferences that distort the given continuous loss distribution. The insurer observes the loss distribution but not…
We study Stackelberg Equilibria (Bowley optima) in a monopolistic centralized sequential-move insurance market, with a profit-maximizing insurer who sets premia using a distortion premium principle, and a single policyholder who seeks to…
We study the design of an optimal insurance contract in which the insured maximizes her expected utility and the insurer limits the variance of his risk exposure while maintaining the principle of indemnity and charging the premium…
We study the optimal investment-reinsurance problem in the context of equity-linked insurance products. Such products often have a capital guarantee, which can motivate insurers to purchase reinsurance. Since a reinsurance contract implies…
We study optimal reinsurance in the framework of stochastic game theory, in which there is an insurer and two reinsurers. A Stackelberg model is established to analyze the non-cooperative relationship between the insurer and reinsurers,…
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal reinsurance design, when the risk is measured by a distortion risk measure and the premium is given by a distortion risk premium. First, we show how the optimal reinsurance design for the…
I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract specifies a menu of insurance policies, contingent on…
This paper studies an optimal insurance contracting problem in which the preferences of the decision maker given by the sum of the expected loss and a convex, increasing function of a deviation measure. As for the deviation measure, our…
This paper investigates a Stackelberg game between an insurer and a reinsurer under the $\alpha$-maxmin mean-variance criterion. The insurer can purchase per-loss reinsurance from the reinsurer. With the insurer's feedback reinsurance…
We study a reinsurer who faces multiple sources of model uncertainty. The reinsurer offers contracts to $n$ insurers whose claims follow compound Poisson processes representing both idiosyncratic and systemic sources of loss. As the…
This paper studies Pareto-optimal reinsurance design in a monopolistic market with multiple primary insurers and a single reinsurer, all with heterogeneous risk preferences. The risk preferences are characterized by a family of risk…
We analyze multiline pricing and capital allocation in equilibrium no-arbitrage markets. Existing theories often assume a perfect complete market, but when pricing is linear, there is no diversification benefit from risk pooling and…
This paper analyzes optimal insurance design when the insurer internalizes the effect of coverage on third-party service prices. A monopolistic insurer contracts with risk-averse agents who have sequential two-dimensional private…
We study a monopolistic insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type $\theta$ is private information that is unobservable to the insurer, and it is drawn from a continuum of types. The hidden type affects both the loss…
In this paper, we study an insurer's reinsurance-investment problem under a mean-variance criterion. We show that excess-loss is the unique equilibrium reinsurance strategy under a spectrally negative L\'{e}vy insurance model when the…
Optimal reinsurance when Value at Risk and expected surplus is balanced through their ratio is studied, and it is demonstrated how results for risk-adjusted surplus can be utilized. Simplifications for large portfolios are derived, and this…
In economic analysis, rational decision-makers often take actions to reduce their risk exposure. These actions include purchasing market insurance and implementing prevention measures to modify the shape of the loss distribution. Under the…
In the literature, insurance and reinsurance pricing is typically determined by a premium principle, characterized by a risk measure that reflects the policy seller's risk attitude. Building on the work of Meyers (1980) and Chen et al.…
In this paper, we address the identification and estimation of insurance models where insurees have private information about their risk and risk aversion. The model includes random damages and allows for several claims, while insurers…