Related papers: Temporary Power Adjusting Withholding Attack
Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems face critical challenges, including excessive energy consumption and the centralization of mining power among entities with expensive hardware. Static mining pools exacerbate these issues by reducing competition…
Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus is traditionally analyzed under the assumption that all miners incur similar costs per unit of computational effort. In reality, costs vary due to factors such as regional electricity cost differences and…
Proof of Authority (PoA) is a type of permissioned consensus algorithm with a fixed committee. PoA has been widely adopted by communities and industries due to its better performance and faster finality. In this paper, we explore the…
The projector augmented wave (PAW) method of Bl\"ochl linearly maps smooth pseudo wavefunctions to the highly oscillatory all-electron DFT orbitals. Compared to norm-conserving pseudopotentials (NCPP), PAW has the advantage of lower kinetic…
Bitcoin is the first secure decentralized electronic currency system. However, it is known to be inefficient due to its proof-of-work (PoW) consensus algorithm and has the potential hazard of double spending. In this paper, we aim to reduce…
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a popular consensus protocol used by Bitcoin since its inception. PoW has the well-known flaw of assigning all the reward to the single miner (or pool) that inserts the new block. This has the consequence of making…
We investigate a narrow but common failure mode of GRPO-style reinforcement learning in the context of sparse verifiable rewards: early updates contain more responses with negative advantages than those with positive advantages, while…
In the pursuit of superior video-processing MLLMs, we have encountered a perplexing paradox: the "anti-scaling law", where more data and larger models lead to worse performance. This study unmasks the culprit: "temporal hacking", a…
The security of Bitcoin protocols is deeply dependent on the incentives provided to miners, which come from a combination of block rewards and transaction fees. As Bitcoin experiences more halving events, the protocol reward converges to…
Mining attacks aim to gain an unfair share of extra rewards in the blockchain mining. Selfish mining can preserve discovered blocks and strategically release them, wasting honest miners' computing resources and getting higher profits.…
Adversarial training in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging because perturbations cascade through trajectories and compound over time, making fixed-strength attacks either overly destructive or too conservative. We propose…
Proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrencies rely on a balance of security and fairness in order to maintain a sustainable ecosystem of miners and users. Users demand fast and consistent transaction confirmation, and in exchange drive the adoption…
Numerous blockchain applications are designed with tasks that naturally have finite durations, and hence, a double-spending attack (DSA) on such blockchain applications leans towards being conducted within a finite timeframe, specifically…
Permissionless Proof-of-Stake (PoS) economic security is predicated on the high cost of violating consensus safety or liveness. We show that liquid staking introduces additional risks that are not captured by standard PoS economic security…
This paper opts to mitigate the energy-inefficiency of the Blockchain Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus algorithm by rationally repurposing the power spent during the mining process. The original PoW mining scheme is designed to consider one…
A soft control of the network activity through varying reward in a proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrency is reported. Rewards are the necessity to incent the contributors activities (i.e., mining) in order to maintain the PoW network. Contrary…
In Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains, the average waiting time to generate a block is inversely proportional to the computing power of the miner. To reduce the average block generation time, a group of individual miners can form a mining pool…
A prevailing belief in attack and defense community is that the higher flatness of adversarial examples enables their better cross-model transferability, leading to a growing interest in employing sharpness-aware minimization and its…
Recently, Mahloujifar and Mahmoody (TCC'17) studied attacks against learning algorithms using a special case of Valiant's malicious noise, called $p$-tampering, in which the adversary gets to change any training example with independent…
In the area of blockchain, numerous methods have been proposed for suppressing intentional forks by attackers more effectively than the random rule. However, all of them, except for the random rule, require major updates, rely on a trusted…