Related papers: Balanced Contributions in Networks and Games with …
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing an edge depends on the {\em load};…
We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…
We introduce balancedness a fairness axiom in house allocation problems. It requires a mechanism to assign the top choice, the second top choice, and so on, on the same number of profiles for each agent. This axiom guarantees equal…
We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…
We study the problem of allocating a finite estate among agents whose total claims exceed the available resources, a standard framework in the theory of claims problems. Two canonical rules embody competing fairness ideals: the Proportional…
In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the energy efficiency (EE) for multi-input multi-output (MIMO) interference channels, subject to the per-link power constraint. To avoid extensive information exchange among all links,…
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…
Network slicing is a key capability for next generation mobile networks. It enables one to cost effectively customize logical networks over a shared infrastructure. A critical component of network slicing is resource allocation, which needs…
Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, the utility an agent obtains depends not only on its allocation but also on the allocation of other agents. An agent has a positive…
In the classical Binary Networked Public Goods (BNPG) game, a player can either invest in a public project or decide not to invest. Based on the decisions of all the players, each player receives a reward as per his/her utility function.…
Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociologists. A Balanced Outcome for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and…
In recent work by Bramoull\'{e} and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further…
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in…
Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to identify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes as players in a…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements.…
Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…