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We consider a dynamic system with multiple types of customers and servers. Each type of waiting customer or server joins a separate queue, forming a bipartite graph with customer-side queues and server-side queues. The platform can match…

Financial markets are often modelled as if time were unique and continuous across assets and markets. Financial markets are however asynchronous, order flow is event-driven, and waiting times between events are often random. Many of the…

Matching and pricing are two critical levers in two-sided marketplaces to connect demand and supply. The platform can produce more efficient matching and pricing decisions by batching the demand requests. We initiate the study of the…

Modern online platforms such as marketplaces, ride-hailing services, and food-delivery systems serve a dual role: they are both markets where participants interact and transact, and operators that design and govern how these markets…

Ridesharing platforms match drivers and riders to trips, using dynamic prices to balance supply and demand. A challenge is to set prices that are appropriately smooth in space and time, so that drivers with the flexibility to decide how to…

Motivated by applications in online marketplaces such as ride-hailing platforms and payment channel networks, we study a single-server queue with state-dependent arrival control. The service operator dynamically chooses the arrival rate as…

We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…

Rideshare platforms, when assigning requests to drivers, tend to maximize profit for the system and/or minimize waiting time for riders. Such platforms can exacerbate biases that drivers may have over certain types of requests. We consider…

We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is…

This paper develops a model to evaluate the viability of blockchain markets as the sole venue for price formation. Blockchains clear at discrete intervals called block time, and transactions are executed sequentially according to priority…

The introduction of leverage on prediction-market event contracts raises three structurally distinct questions that have not been addressed jointly: how leverage changes manipulation incentives, how it interacts with informed-trading rents,…

Auction is applied for trade with various mechanisms. A simple but practical question is which mechanism, typically first-price or second-price auctions, is preferred from the perspective of bidders or sellers. A celebrated answer is…

We study pricing mechanisms for low-latency payload delivery in settings where participant rewards depend on the time required to reconstruct a payload. In such environments, the decoding time distribution determines deadline-meeting…

Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…

Traditional blockchain design gives miners or validators full control over transaction ordering, i.e., they can freely choose which transactions to include or exclude, as well as in which order. While not an issue initially, the emergence…

Motivated by online display ad exchanges, we study a setting in which an exchange repeatedly interacts with bidders who have quota, making decisions about which subsets of bidders are called to participate in ad-slot-specific auctions. A…

Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediates economic transactions between buyers and sellers.…

We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round $t$, a market maker posts a bid price $B_t$ and an ask price $A_t$ to an incoming trader (the taker) with a private valuation for one unit of some asset. If the trader's…