Related papers: Learning to Coordinate over Networks with Bounded …

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…

Logit Dynamics [Blume, Games and Economic Behavior, 1993] are randomized best response dynamics for strategic games: at every time step a player is selected uniformly at random and she chooses a new strategy according to a probability…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems requiring strategic coordination. While recent work has analyzed LLM behavior in two-player games, coalition formation, where $n$ agents dynamically form…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents'…

We study binary coordination games over graphs under log-linear learning when neighbor actions are conveyed through explicit noisy communication links. Each edge is modeled as either a binary symmetric channel (BSC) or a binary erasure…

Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…

Simple binary-state coordination models are widely used to study collective socio-economic phenomena such as the spread of innovations or the adoption of products on social networks. The common trait of these systems is the occurrence of…

This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents have opposing objectives with regards to the optimization of a common objective function. In the resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with…

Concurrent stochastic games are an important formalism for the rational verification of probabilistic multi-agent systems, which involves verifying whether a temporal logic property is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent…

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper,…

This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…

We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…

Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…