Related papers: The Screening Cost of Liquidity

We study how market segmentation affects consumers when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously. We characterize the…

A designer distributes goods while considering the perceived equity of the resulting allocation. Such concerns are modeled through an equity constraint requiring that equally deserving agents receive equal allocations. I ask what forms of…

Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

We consider a seller who offers services to a buyer with multi-unit demand. Prior to the realization of demand, the buyer receives a noisy signal of their future demand, and the seller can design contracts based on the reported value of…

As financial institutions increasingly rely on machine learning models to automate lending decisions, concerns about algorithmic fairness have risen. This paper explores the tradeoff between enforcing fairness constraints (such as…

Convex duality for two two different super--replication problems in a continuous time financial market with proportional transaction cost is proved. In this market, static hedging in a finite number of options, in addition to usual dynamic…

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and…

This paper studies a dynamic screening model in which a principal hires an agent with limited liability. The agent's private cost of working is an i.i.d. draw from a continuous distribution. His working status is publicly observable. The…

We introduce capital flow constraints, loss of good will and loan to the lot sizing problem. Capital flow constraint is different from traditional capacity constraints: when a manufacturer launches production, its present capital should not…

Federal student loans are fixed-rate debt contracts with three main special features: (i) borrowers can use income-driven schemes to make payments proportional to their income above subsistence, (ii) after several years of good standing,…

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…

We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…

Internet users have suffered collateral damage in tussles over paid peering between large ISPs and large content providers. In order to qualify for settlement-free peering, large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) require that peers meet…

Screening rules were recently introduced as a technique for explicitly identifying active structures such as sparsity, in optimization problem arising in machine learning. This has led to new methods of acceleration based on a substantial…

Many early order flow auction designs handle the payment for orders when they execute on the chain rather than when they are won in the auction. Payments in these auctions only take place when the orders are executed, creating a free option…

Demand response provides utilities with a mechanism to share with end users the stochasticity resulting from the use of renewable sources. Pricing is accordingly used to reflect energy availability, to allocate such a limited resource to…

We introduce the problem of assigning resources to improve their utilization. The motivation comes from settings where agents have uncertainty about their own values for using a resource, and where it is in the interest of a group that…

We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…

In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of actions, where each potential action…