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With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
Motivated by the recent applications of game-theoretical learning techniques to the design of distributed control systems, we study a class of control problems that can be formulated as potential games with continuous action sets, and we…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composing of cyber, physical, and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to…
Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…
This paper investigates heterogeneous-cost task allocation with budget constraints (HCTAB), wherein heterogeneity is manifested through the varying capabilities and costs associated with different agents for task execution. Different from…
We characterize zonal ancillary market coupling relying on noncooperative game theory. To that purpose, we formulate the ancillary market as a multi-leader single follower bilevel problem, that we subsequently cast as a generalized Nash…
This paper is concerned with the leader-following consensus problem for a class of Lipschitz nonlinear multi-agent systems with uncertain dynamics, where each agent only transmits its noisy output, at discrete instants and independently…
Underlying relationships among multi-agent systems (MAS) in hazardous scenarios can be represented as Game-theoretic models. We measure the performance of MAS achieving tasks from the perspective of balancing success probability and system…
Research concerning organization and coordination within multi-agent systems continues to draw from a variety of architectures and methodologies. The work presented in this paper combines techniques from game theory and multi-agent systems…
Designing the optimal linear quadratic regulator (LQR) for a large-scale multi-agent system (MAS) is time-consuming since it involves solving a large-size matrix Riccati equation. The situation is further exasperated when the design needs…
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…
This work focuses on the credit assignment problem in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Sharing the global advantage among agents often leads to insufficient policy optimization, as it fails to capture the coalitional…
This paper proposes two algorithms, namely "back-tracking" and "history following", to reach consensus in case of communication loss for a network of distributed agents with switching topologies. To reach consensus in distributed control,…
This paper introduces semi-competitive differential game logic dGLsc, which enables verification of safety-critical applications that involve interactions between two agents. In dGLsc, these interactions are specified as games on hybrid…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
This technical note presents a leader-follower scheme for network aggregative games. The followers and leader are selfish cost minimizing agents. The cost function of each follower is affected by strategy of leader and aggregated strategies…
Cooperative multi-agent systems require robust mechanisms for credit assignment under uncertainty. Here we introduce a variational framework, termed the Game-Theoretic Free Energy Principle (GT-FEP), that models coalition formation through…
Despite increasing attention paid to the need for fast, scalable methods to analyze next-generation neuroscience data, comparatively little attention has been paid to the development of similar methods for behavioral analysis. Just as the…
This paper seeks to combine differential game theory with the actor-critic-identifier architecture to determine forward-in-time, approximate optimal controllers for formation tracking in multi-agent systems, where the agents have uncertain…