Related papers: ShieldNet: Network-Level Guardrails against Emergi…
With the ubiquity of Large Language Models (LLMs), guardrails have become crucial to detect and defend against toxic content. However, with the increasing pervasiveness of LLMs in multilingual scenarios, their effectiveness in handling…
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check,…
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to interact with external tools via tool descriptors, thereby extending their capabilities for task execution, autonomous decision-making, and multi-agent coordination.…
Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt…
Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of…
Tool-using LLM agents must act on untrusted webpages, emails, files, and API outputs while issuing privileged tool calls. Existing defenses often mediate trust at the granularity of an entire tool invocation, forcing a brittle choice in…
We introduce MCP-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) on realistic, multi-step tasks that demand tool use, cross-tool coordination, precise parameter control, and planning/reasoning for solving tasks. Built on the…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to a sophisticated form of adversarial prompting known as camouflaged jailbreaking. This method embeds malicious intent within seemingly benign language to evade existing safety…
Edge deployment of LLM agents on IoT hardware introduces attack surfaces absent from cloud-hosted orchestration. We present an empirical security analysis of three architectures (cloud-hosted, edge-local swarm, and hybrid) using a…
The deployment of Large Language Model (LLM)-generated SQL queries in Artificial Intelligence of Things (AIoT) systems introduces critical security risks, as prompt injection attacks can manipulate LLMs into producing unauthorized queries…
Web agents have emerged as an effective paradigm for automating interactions with complex web environments, yet remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that embed malicious instructions into webpage content to induce unintended…
Agentic AI systems introduce a security surface that is qualitatively different from that of stateless LLMs. They persist memory, invoke external tools, coordinate with peer agents, and operate across sessions, allowing attacks to emerge…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into critical systems in industries like healthcare and finance. Users can often submit queries to LLM-enabled chatbots, some of which can enrich responses with information retrieved…
The rapid evolution of embodied agents has accelerated the deployment of household robots in real-world environments. However, unlike structured industrial settings, household spaces introduce unpredictable safety risks, where system…
Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an…
Large Language Model (LLM) agents face security vulnerabilities spanning AI-specific and traditional software domains, yet current research addresses these separately. This study bridges this gap through comparative evaluation of Function…
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) and the introduction of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) have significantly expanded LLM agents' capability to interact dynamically with external tools and APIs. However, existing tool…
Guardrails are critical for the safe deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs)-powered software. Unlike traditional rule-based systems with limited, predefined input-output spaces that inherently constrain unsafe behavior, LLMs enable…
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) has been proposed to allow multiple mutually distrustful data owners to jointly train machine learning (ML) models on their combined data. However, by design, MPC protocols faithfully compute the training…
In this work, we study security of Model Context Protocol (MCP) agent toolchains and their applications in smart homes. We introduce AegisMCP, a protocol-level intrusion detector. Our contributions are: (i) a minimal attack suite spanning…