Related papers: Coarse Screening
When introducing a novel product, a seller sets a price and decides how much information to provide to a buyer, who may incur a search cost to discover an outside option. The buyer knows the outside option distribution; the seller knows…
In many analyses the object reported at the end is not fixed in advance, but is chosen after a preliminary search over variables, subgroups, transformations, models or contrasts. Classical selective-inference methods are most effective when…
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…
Higher criticism is a method for detecting signals that are both sparse and weak. Although first proposed in cases where the noise variables are independent, higher criticism also has reasonable performance in settings where those variables…
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the…
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information…
Consider a network design application where we wish to lay down a minimum-cost spanning tree in a given graph; however, we only have stochastic information about the edge costs. To learn the precise cost of any edge, we have to conduct a…
Kyle (1985) builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived private information submits an optimal order in each period given the market maker's pricing rule. An inconsistency exists to some extent in the…
We study procurement design when the buyer is uncertain about both the value of the good and the seller's cost. The buyer has a conjectured model but does not fully trust it. She first identifies mechanisms that maximize her worst-case…
The notion of expense in Bayesian optimisation generally refers to the uniformly expensive cost of function evaluations over the whole search space. However, in some scenarios, the cost of evaluation for black-box objective functions is…
We study an information design problem with continuous state and discrete signal space. Under convex and S-shaped value functions, the optimal information structure is interval-partitional and exhibits a dual expectations property: each…
An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this…
A seller offers an asset in a decentralised market. Buyers have private signals about their common value. I study whether the market becomes allocatively more efficient with (i) more buyers, (ii) better-informed buyers. Both increase the…
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the…
This paper studies a search problem where a consumer is initially aware of only a few products. At every point in time, the consumer then decides between searching among alternatives he is already aware of and discovering more products. I…
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…
Recently dictionary screening has been proposed as an effective way to improve the computational efficiency of solving the lasso problem, which is one of the most commonly used method for learning sparse representations. To address today's…
A decision maker records measurements of a finite-state Markov chain corrupted by noise. The goal is to decide when the Markov chain hits a specific target state. The decision maker can choose from a finite set of sampling intervals to pick…
A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…
In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the…