Related papers: Finite-Time Analysis of Q-Value Iteration for Gene…

The objective of this paper is to investigate the finite-time analysis of a Q-learning algorithm applied to two-player zero-sum Markov games. Specifically, we establish a finite-time analysis of both the minimax Q-learning algorithm and the…

This paper addresses zero-sum ``turn'' games, in which only one player can make decisions at each state. We show that pure saddle-point state-feedback policies for turn games can be constructed from dynamic programming fixed-point equations…

Soft Q-learning is a variation of Q-learning designed to solve entropy regularized Markov decision problems where an agent aims to maximize the entropy regularized value function. Despite its empirical success, there have been limited…

We consider the problem of two-player zero-sum games. This problem is formulated as a min-max Markov game in the literature. The solution of this game, which is the min-max payoff, starting from a given state is called the min-max value of…

Within the context of video games the notion of perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it leads to uninteresting situations, where humans face tough adversarial decision makers. Current frameworks for stochastic games and…

We study a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its asymptotic behavior in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not know the game…

An interesting iterative procedure is proposed to solve a two-player zero-sum Markov games. Under suitable assumption, the boundedness of the proposed iterates is obtained theoretically. Using results from stochastic approximation, the…

As assembly tasks grow in complexity, collaboration among multiple robots becomes essential for task completion. However, centralized task planning has become inadequate for adapting to the increasing intelligence and versatility of robots,…

Many real-world applications involve some agents that fall into two teams, with payoffs that are equal within the same team but of opposite sign across the opponent team. The so-called two-team zero-sum Markov games (2t0sMGs) can be…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

Q-learning is known as one of the fundamental reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. Its convergence has been the focus of extensive research over the past several decades. Recently, a new finitetime error bound and analysis for Q-learning…

Learning in stochastic games is arguably the most standard and fundamental setting in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). In this paper, we consider decentralized MARL in stochastic games in the non-asymptotic regime. In particular,…

In this paper, we consider the problem of optimization and learning for constrained and multi-objective Markov decision processes, for both discounted rewards and expected average rewards. We formulate the problems as zero-sum games where…

Achieving convergence of multiple learning agents in general $N$-player games is imperative for the development of safe and reliable machine learning (ML) algorithms and their application to autonomous systems. Yet it is known that, outside…

This paper addresses the challenge of limited observations in non-cooperative multi-agent systems where agents can have partial access to other agents' actions. We present the generalized individual Q-learning dynamics that combine…

Although Q-learning is one of the most successful algorithms for finding the best action-value function (and thus the optimal policy) in reinforcement learning, its implementation often suffers from large overestimation of Q-function values…

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in infinite-horizon discounted zero-sum Markov games. We focus on the practical but challenging setting of decentralized MARL, where agents make decisions without coordination by a…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

Q-learning has long been one of the most popular reinforcement learning algorithms, and theoretical analysis of Q-learning has been an active research topic for decades. Although researches on asymptotic convergence analysis of Q-learning…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has witnessed a remarkable surge in interest, fueled by the empirical success achieved in applications of single-agent reinforcement learning (RL). In this study, we consider a distributed…