Related papers: How Alignment Routes: Localizing, Scaling, and Con…
Attention is the core mechanism of today's most used architectures for natural language processing and has been analyzed from many perspectives, including its effectiveness for machine translation-related tasks. Among these studies,…
Large language model (LLM) deployments increasingly rely on multi-agent architectures in which multiple models either compete through routing mechanisms or collaborate to produce a final answer. In both settings, the learning signal…
Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to ensure safe conversations with humans. However, this paper introduces a training-free attack method capable of reversing safety alignment, converting the outcomes of stronger…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed to automatically label and analyze educational dialogue at scale, yet current pipelines lack reliable ways to detect when models are wrong. We investigate whether reasoning generated by…
Recent work has shown that language models' refusal behavior is primarily encoded in a single direction in their latent space, making it vulnerable to targeted attacks. Although Latent Adversarial Training (LAT) attempts to improve…
Attention layers are widely used in natural language processing (NLP) and are beginning to influence computer vision architectures. Training very large transformer models allowed significant improvement in both fields, but once trained,…
If AI models can detect when they are being evaluated, the effectiveness of evaluations might be compromised. For example, models could have systematically different behavior during evaluations, leading to less reliable benchmarks for…
Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its…
Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, and single-layer defenses often trade security for usability. We present TRYLOCK, the first defense-in-depth architecture that combines four heterogeneous mechanisms across the…
Conditional depth execution routes a subset of tokens through a lightweight cheap FFN while the remainder execute the standard full FFN at each controlled layer. The central difficulty is gate training: the gate decision must propagate…
Detecting biases in the outputs produced by generative models is essential to reduce the potential risks associated with their application in critical settings. However, the majority of existing methodologies for identifying biases in…
Large language models are proliferating, and so are the benchmarks that serve as their common yardsticks. We ask how the agglomeration patterns of these two layers compare: do they evolve in tandem or diverge? Drawing on two curated proxies…
Backdoor data poisoning, inserted within instruction examples used to fine-tune a foundation Large Language Model (LLM) for downstream tasks (\textit{e.g.,} sentiment prediction), is a serious security concern due to the evasive nature of…
Despite their capabilities, large foundation models (LFMs) remain susceptible to adversarial manipulation. Current defenses predominantly rely on the "locality hypothesis", suppressing isolated neurons or features. However, harmful…
Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms for safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), encounter the challenge of distribution shift. Current approaches typically address this issue…
Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental…
The proliferation of large language models (LLMs) with varying computational costs and performance profiles presents a critical challenge for scalable, cost-effective deployment in real-world applications. We introduce a unified routing…
Multi-agent debate improves LLM reasoning, yet agreement among agents is not evidence of correctness. When agents converge on a wrong answer through social reinforcement, consensus-based stopping commits that error to an automated action…
Alignment tuning has enabled large language models to excel in reasoning, instruction-following, and minimizing harmful generations. However, despite their widespread deployment, these models exhibit a monolingual bias, raising concerns…
We present a neural architecture for modeling argumentative dialogue that explicitly models the interplay between an Opinion Holder's (OH's) reasoning and a challenger's argument, with the goal of predicting if the argument successfully…