Related papers: Optimal Pricing with Unreliable Signals
This work presents an asset pricing model that under rational expectation equilibrium perspective shows how, depending on risk aversion and noise volatility, a risky-asset has one equilibrium price that differs in term of efficiency: an…
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…
We investigate the optimal tradeoff between information gained about an unknown coherent state and the state disturbance caused by the measurement process. We propose several optical schemes that can enable this task, and we implement one…
This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design…
Posted price mechanisms (PPM) constitute one of the predominant practices to price goods in online marketplaces and their revenue guarantees have been a central object of study in the last decade. We consider a basic setting where the…
We address the trade-off between information gain and state disturbance in measurement performed on qudit systems and devise a class of optimal measurement schemes that saturate the ultimate bound imposed by quantum mechanics to estimation…
Pricing decisions are often made when market information is still poor. In turn, existing theoretical models often reason about the response of optimal prices to changing market characteristics without exploiting all available information…
Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…
Internet advertisers (buyers) repeatedly procure ad impressions from ad platforms (sellers) with the aim to maximize total conversion (i.e. ad value) while respecting both budget and return-on-investment (ROI) constraints for efficient…
Most methods for publishing data with privacy guarantees introduce randomness into datasets which reduces the utility of the published data. In this paper, we study the privacy-utility tradeoff by taking maximal leakage as the privacy…
The growing demand for data and AI-generated digital goods, such as personalized written content and artwork, necessitates effective pricing and feedback mechanisms that account for uncertain utility and costly production. Motivated by…
This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of…
We study the problem of designing posted-price mechanisms in order to sell a single unit of a single item within a finite period of time. Motivated by real-world problems, such as, e.g., long-term rental of rooms and apartments, we assume…
We develop inference under model uncertainty due to weak, noisy, multiple candidate restrictions and theories, and nuisance control covariates. A unified framework is given with degrees of misspecification and corresponding shadow prices,…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
In the online (time-series) search problem, a player is presented with a sequence of prices which are revealed in an online manner. In the standard definition of the problem, for each revealed price, the player must decide irrevocably…
This work addresses the problem of revenue maximization in a repeated, unlimited supply item-pricing auction while preserving buyer privacy. We present a novel algorithm that provides differential privacy with respect to the buyer's input…
A monopoly platform sells either a risky product (with unknown utility) or a safe product (with known utility) to agents who sequentially arrive and learn the utility of the risky product by the reporting of previous agents. It is costly…
This paper is concerned with the security problem for interconnected systems, where each subsystem is required to detect local attacks using locally available information and the information received from its neighboring subsystems.…
Motivated by the problem of selling large, proprietary data, we consider an information pricing problem proposed by Bergemann et al. that involves a decision-making buyer and a monopolistic seller. The seller has access to the underlying…