Related papers: UK AISI Alignment Evaluation Case-Study
As artificial intelligence systems grow more powerful, there has been increasing interest in "AI safety" research to address emerging and future risks. However, the field of AI safety remains poorly defined and inconsistently measured,…
This paper presents a comprehensive empirical study on the safety alignment capabilities. We evaluate what matters for safety alignment in LLMs and LRMs to provide essential insights for developing more secure and reliable AI systems. We…
Traditional safety engineering assesses systems in their context of use, e.g. the operational design domain (road layout, speed limits, weather, etc.) for self-driving vehicles (including those using AI). We refer to this as downstream…
Specialized clinical AI assistants are rapidly entering medical practice, often framed as safer or more reliable than general-purpose large language models (LLMs). Yet, unlike frontier models, these clinical tools are rarely subjected to…
Safety cases for frontier AI systems should provide a convincing argument, supported by evidence, that the risk of harm is within an acceptable bound. When developers author their own safety cases, confirmation bias and conflicted…
AI leaders and safety reports increasingly warn that advances in model reasoning may enable biological misuse, including by low-expertise users, while major labs describe safeguards as expanding but still evolving rather than settled. This…
The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a…
AI Assurance -- producing the machine-readable evidence required to demonstrate compliance with AI governance frameworks -- has mature policy scaffolding but lacks the infrastructure to operationalize it. Organizations building high-risk AI…
As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world decision-making systems, understanding their behavioural vulnerabilities remains a critical challenge for AI safety and alignment. While existing evaluation…
As AI models are increasingly deployed across diverse real-world scenarios, ensuring their safety remains a critical yet underexplored challenge. While substantial efforts have been made to evaluate and enhance AI safety, the lack of a…
Generalist multimodal AI systems such as large language models (LLMs) and vision language models (VLMs) are increasingly accessed by clinicians and patients alike for medical image interpretation through widely available consumer-facing…
Code generation has emerged as one of AI's highest-impact use cases, yet existing benchmarks measure isolated tasks rather than the complete "zero-to-one" process of building a working application from scratch. We introduce Vibe Code Bench,…
To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations…
Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and…
Background. Traditional safety benchmarks for language models evaluate generated text: whether a model outputs toxic language, reproduces bias, or follows harmful instructions. When models are deployed as agents, the safety-relevant object…
We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used adversarial safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world adversarial attacks based on three…
AI-for-Code (AI4Code) systems are reshaping software engineering, with tools like GitHub Copilot accelerating code generation, translation, and vulnerability detection. Alongside these advances, however, security risks remain pervasive:…
This article, a lightly adapted version of Perplexity's response to NIST/CAISI Request for Information 2025-0035, details our observations and recommendations concerning the security of frontier AI agents. These insights are informed by…
Safety cases - clear, assessable arguments for the safety of a system in a given context - are a widely-used technique across various industries for showing a decision-maker (e.g. boards, customers, third parties) that a system is safe. In…
Developers try to evaluate whether an AI system can be misused by adversaries before releasing it; for example, they might test whether a model enables cyberoffense, user manipulation, or bioterrorism. In this work, we show that…