Related papers: TORCH: Characterizing Invalid Route Filtering via …
A proposal to improve routing security---Route Origin Authorization (ROA)---has been standardized. A ROA specifies which network is allowed to announce a set of Internet destinations. While some networks now specify ROAs, little is known…
BGP is the default inter-domain routing protocol in today's Internet, but has serious security vulnerabilities\cite{murphy2005bgp}. One of them is (sub)prefix hijacking. IETF standardizes RPKI to validate the AS origin but RPKI has a lot of…
IP prefix hijacks allow adversaries to redirect and intercept traffic, posing a threat to the stability and security of the Internet. To prevent prefix hijacks, networks should deploy RPKI and filter bogus BGP announcements with invalid…
Tor is a well-known anonymous communication tool, used by people with various privacy and security needs. Prior works have exploited routing attacks to observe Tor traffic and deanonymize Tor users. Subsequently, location-aware relay…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is the main mechanism to protect inter-domain routing with BGP from prefix hijacks. It has already been widely deployed by large providers and the adoption rate is getting to a critical point.…
The long history of misconfigurations and errors in RPKI indicates that they cannot be easily avoided and will most probably persist also in the future. These errors create conflicts between BGP announcements and their covering ROAs,…
The IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) was recently introduced as the new routing standard for the Internet of Things. Although RPL defines basic security modes, it remains vulnerable to topological attacks which…
Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR attacks,…
Over recent years, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has seen increasing adoption, with now 37.8% of the major networks filtering bogus BGP routes. Systems interact with the RPKI over Relying Party (RP) implementations that…
The rapidly expanding Internet of Things (IoT) landscape is shifting toward cloudless architectures, removing reliance on centralized cloud services but exposing devices directly to the internet and increasing their vulnerability to…
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) secures the Internet's routing system by defining a complex trust and validation framework for certificates, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), manifests, and Certificate Revocation Lists…
IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is an essential routing protocol to enable communications for IoT networks with low power devices. RPL uses an objective function and routing constraints to find an optimized…
Source Address Validation (SAV) is a standard aimed at discarding packets with spoofed source IP addresses. The absence of SAV for outgoing traffic has been known as a root cause of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and received…
Tor is a widely used anonymity network that conceals user identities by routing traffic through encrypted relays, yet it remains vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks that deanonymize users by matching patterns in ingress and egress…
The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication. However, Tor is known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe traffic at both ends of the communication path. In this paper, we show that prior attacks are just the…
This paper concerns the problem of the absence of ingress filtering at the network edge, one of the main causes of important network security issues. Numerous network operators do not deploy the best current practice - Source Address…
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) remains a fragile pillar of Internet routing. BGP hijacks still occurr daily. While full deployment of Route Origin Validation (ROV) is ongoing, attackers have already adapted, launching post-ROV attacks…
IP spoofing enables reflection and amplification attacks, which cause major threats to the current Internet infrastructure. Detecting IP packets with incorrect source addresses would help to improve the situation. This is easy at the…
As IPv6 deployment accelerates, understanding the evolving security posture of network peripheries becomes increasingly important. A DSN 2021 study introduced the first large-scale discovery of IPv6 network peripheries, uncovering risks…
Existing methods for active topology discovery within the IPv6 Internet largely mirror those of IPv4. In light of the large and sparsely populated address space, in conjunction with aggressive ICMPv6 rate limiting by routers, this work…