Related papers: Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stabl…
Let $P$ be a set of points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, where each point $p\in P$ has an associated transmission range $\rho(p)$. The range assignment $\rho$ induces a directed communication graph $\mathcal{G}_{\rho}(P)$ on $P$, which contains an…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
We consider a special case of the generalized minimum spanning tree problem (GMST) and the generalized travelling salesman problem (GTSP) where we are given a set of points inside the integer grid (in Euclidean plane) where each grid cell…
The Subset-Sums Ratio problem (SSR) is an optimization problem in which, given a set of integers, the goal is to find two subsets such that the ratio of their sums is as close to 1 as possible. In this paper we develop a new FPTAS for the…
We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…
Stability perserving is an important topic in approximation of systems, e.g.\ model reduction. If the original system is stable, we often want the approximation to be stable. But even if an algorithm preserves stability the resulting system…
Sequential algorithms for the Stable Matching Problem are often too slow in the context of some large scale applications like switch scheduling. Parallel architectures can offer a notable decrease in runtime complexity. We propose a stable…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from…
In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…
Network control refers to a very large and diverse set of problems including controllability of linear time-invariant dynamical systems, where the objective is to select an appropriate input to steer the network to a desired state. There…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
A metro-line crossing minimization problem is to draw multiple lines on an underlying graph that models stations and rail tracks so that the number of crossings of lines becomes minimum. It has several variations by adding restrictions on…
Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, each man has an incomplete preference list of women, each woman does an incomplete preference list of dogs, and each dog does an incomplete preference list of men. We understand a family as a triple…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…
The set of stable matchings induces a distributive lattice. The supremum of the stable matching lattice is the boy-optimal (girl-pessimal) stable matching and the infimum is the girl-optimal (boy-pessimal) stable matching. The classical…
In the symmetric rendezvous problem two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of $n$ locations in each time step $t=0,1,2,\dots$. Their goal is to minimize the expected time until they visit the same location and thus…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating indivisible, mixed-manna items. For basic measures of fairness, this problem is hard in general. Thus, research has flourished concerning input classes where efficient algorithms…