Related papers: Dynamics of voting strategies and public good fund…
A stylized experiment, the public goods game, has taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to contribute more to shared resources than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
In a static environment, optional participation and a local agglomeration of cooperators are found to be beneficial for the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation. In the optional public goods game, the rock-scissors-paper cycles of…
In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated by means of…
Inspired by the spread of discontent as in the 2016 presidential election, we consider a voter model in which 0's are ordinary voters and 1's are zealots. Thinking of a social network, but desiring the simplicity of an infinite object that…
The outcomes of democratic elections rest on individuals' decision-making that is driven by their varying preferences and beliefs. Individuals may prefer consensus to gridlock, or gridlock to consensus, and information may be fractured via…
The influence of zealots on the noisy voter model is studied theoretically and numerically at the mean-field level. The noisy voter model is a modification of the voter model that includes a second mechanism for transitions between states:…
Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not well…
We propose a new version of the spatial model of voting. Platforms of five parties are evolving in a two-dimensional landscape of political issues so as to get maximal numbers of voters. For a Gaussian landscape the evolution leads to a…
The Hotelling-Downs model considers parties changing policy to maximise their vote-share. Where policy position lies on a left-right axis, it describes a tendency for political parties to move towards centrist platforms. This is in contrast…
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest…
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…
The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides…
Motion is a typical reaction among animals and humans trying to reach better conditions in a changing world. This aspect has been studied intensively in social dilemmas where competing players' individual and collective interests are in…
The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third…
Individual choices are either based on personal experience or on information provided by peers. The latter case, causes individuals to conform to the majority in their neighborhood. Such herding behavior may be very efficient in aggregating…
Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them.…
We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy…
We introduce a variant of the voter model in which agents may have different degrees of confidence on their opinions. Those with low confidence are normal voters whose state can change upon a single contact with a different neighboring…