Related papers: Experimental School Choice with Parents
In school choice problems, the motivation for students' welfare (efficiency) is restrained by concerns to respect schools' priorities (fairness). Among the fair matchings, even the best one in terms of welfare (SOSM) is inefficient.…
The celebrated Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism (EADA) improves the efficiency of the DA algorithm via consented priority violations. Notwithstanding its many merits, we show that EADA can improve only two students when an…
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call the…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
We examine the problem of assigning teachers to public schools over time when teachers have tenured positions and can work simultaneously in multiple schools. To do this, we investigate a dynamic many-to-many school choice problem where…
We conduct an incentivized lab experiment to test participants' ability to understand the DA matching mechanism and the strategyproofness property, conveyed in different ways. We find that while many participants can (using a novel GUI)…
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide…
Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants.…
In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized…
The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own.…
We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask individuals if they consent to waive their priority…
This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems, which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching mechanism's information size by counting the maximal relevant…
Counterfactual analysis is central to education market design and provides a foundation for credible policy recommendations. We develop a novel methodology for counterfactual analysis in Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance (DA) assignment…
In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…