Related papers: Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Symmetric Fir…
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…
We address the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only observe the actions of some neighbors, while its cost possibly depends on the strategies of other agents. Our main contribution is…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
Trading algorithms that execute large orders are susceptible to exploitation by order anticipation strategies. This paper studies the influence of order anticipation strategies in a multi-investor model of optimal execution under transient…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…
In combinatorial auctions, a designer must decide how to allocate a set of indivisible items amongst a set of bidders. Each bidder has a valuation function which gives the utility they obtain from any subset of the items. Our focus is…
We consider the optimization problem of a multi-resource, multi-unit VCG auction that produces an optimal, i.e., non-approximated, social welfare. We present an algorithm that solves this optimization problem with pseudo-polynomial…
Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…
We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a…
This study explores the design of an efficient rebate policy in auction markets, focusing on a continuous-time setting with competition among market participants. In this model, a stock exchange collects transaction fees from auction…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
The optimization of expensive-to-evaluate black-box functions over combinatorial structures is an ubiquitous task in machine learning, engineering and the natural sciences. The combinatorial explosion of the search space and costly…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…