Related papers: Cooperation in Public Goods Games over Uniform Ran…
How cooperation can evolve between players is an unsolved problem of biology. Here we use Hamiltonian dynamics of models of the Ising type to describe populations of cooperating and defecting players to show that the equilibrium fraction of…
Graphs are a standard framework for describing dynamical processes shaped by pairwise interactions among agents. But many systems involve interactions in groups of three or more agents. Here, we develop a method of "$\ell$-hyperedge…
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…
This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…
Recent paradigm shifts from imitation learning to reinforcement learning (RL) is shown to be productive in understanding human behaviors. In the RL paradigm, individuals search for optimal strategies through interaction with the environment…
Individual cooperative strategy influences the surrounding dynamic population, which in turn affects cooperative strategy. To better model this phenomenon, we develop a Markov decision chain based game transitions model and examine the…
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
This paper proposes a mathematical model for the coevolution of actions and opinions for a population facing a social dilemma. In particular, we assume each person participates in a Public Goods Game (PGG), with their action being to…
Higher-order interactions are prevalent in real-world complex systems and exert unique influences on system evolution that cannot be captured by pairwise interactions. We incorporate game transitions into the higher-order prisoner's dilemma…
Cooperative behaviors are deeply embedded in structured biological and social systems. Networks are often employed to portray pairwise interactions among individuals, where network nodes represent individuals and links indicate who…
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying games on multiplex networks that account for interactions across linked social contexts. However, little is known about how potential cross-context interference, or spillover, of…
The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third…
The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem for evolutionary biology because cooperation is undermined by selfish cheaters (or "free riders") that profit from cooperators but do not invest any resources themselves. In a purely…
Using methods from evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates the difference between social cohesion and task cohesion in promoting the evolution of cooperation in group interactions. Players engage in public goods games and are…
Imitation is a basic updating mechanism for strategy evolution in structured populations, determining how individuals sample social information and translate it into behavioral changes. Higher-order networks, such as hypergraphs, generalize…
Heterogeneity has been studied as one of the most common explanations of the puzzle of cooperation in social dilemmas. A large number of papers have been published discussing the effects of increasing heterogeneity in structured populations…
In a large population, the agents temporally form group of the Public Goods Game (PGG) one after another, and size of one group is randomly distributed at $g\in [g_l,g_h]$. Players in it have two strategies to be chosen to cooperate, or to…
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…