Related papers: Profit is the Red Team: Stress-Testing Agents in S…
LLM-based agent systems increasingly rely on agent skills sourced from open registries to extend their capabilities, yet the openness of such ecosystems makes skills difficult to thoroughly vet. Existing attacks rely on injecting malicious…
Recently, red teaming, with roots in security, has become a key evaluative approach to ensure the safety and reliability of Generative Artificial Intelligence. However, most existing work emphasizes technical benchmarks and attack success…
Alignment audits aim to robustly identify hidden goals from strategic, situationally aware misaligned models. Despite this threat model, existing auditing methods have not been systematically stress-tested against deception strategies. We…
Agent skills extend LLM agents with reusable instructions, tool interfaces, and executable code, and users increasingly install third-party skills from marketplaces, repositories, and community channels. Because a skill exposes both…
We study systems of interacting reinforced stochastic processes, where agents' decisions evolve under reinforcement, network-mediated interactions, and environmental influences. In competitive environments with irreducible networks, we…
Customer-service LLM agents increasingly make policy-bound decisions (refunds, rebooking, billing disputes), but the same ``helpful'' interaction style can be exploited: a small fraction of users can induce unauthorized concessions,…
Ensuring the safe deployment of AI systems is critical in industry settings where biased outputs can lead to significant operational, reputational, and regulatory risks. Thorough evaluation before deployment is essential to prevent these…
Red teaming is critical for identifying vulnerabilities and building trust in current LLMs. However, current automated methods for Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on brittle prompt templates or single-turn attacks, failing to capture the…
Red-teaming, where adversarial prompts are crafted to expose harmful behaviors and assess risks, offers a dynamic approach to surfacing underlying stereotypical bias in large language models. Because such subtle harms are best recognized by…
Red teaming assesses how large language models (LLMs) can produce content that violates norms, policies, and rules set during their safety training. However, most existing automated methods in the literature are not representative of the…
LLM-based agents execute real-world workflows via tools and memory. These affordances enable ill-intended adversaries to also use these agents to carry out complex misuse scenarios. Existing agent misuse benchmarks largely test…
With the widespread application of LLM-based agents across various domains, their complexity has introduced new security threats. Existing red-team methods mostly rely on modifying user prompts, which lack adaptability to new data and may…
As the industry increasingly adopts agentic AI systems, understanding their unique vulnerabilities becomes critical. Prior research suggests that security flaws at the model level do not fully capture the risks present in agentic…
Automated methods for red teaming LLMs are an important tool to identify LLM vulnerabilities that may not be covered in static benchmarks, allowing for more thorough probing. They can also adapt to each specific LLM to discover weaknesses…
While recent automated red-teaming methods show promise for systematically exposing model vulnerabilities, most existing approaches rely on human-specified workflows. This dependence on manually designed workflows suffers from human biases…
AI systems are entering critical domains like healthcare, finance, and defense, yet remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While AI red teaming is a primary defense, current approaches force operators into manual, library-specific…
Humans possess innate collaborative capacities. However, effective teamwork often remains challenging. This study delves into the feasibility of collaboration within teams of rational, self-interested agents who engage in teamwork without…
Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human…
Foundation model-based agents are increasingly used to automate complex tasks, enhancing efficiency and productivity. However, their access to sensitive resources and autonomous decision-making also introduce significant security risks,…
Automated red-teaming methods for large language models typically optimize attack prompts within a fixed, human-designed strategy, leaving the attack strategy itself unchanged. We instead optimize the strategy. We propose AutoRISE, a method…