Related papers: Distribution-Free Equilibrium in Search Contests
We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…
Shortlisting is a common and effective method for pre-selecting participants in competitive settings. To ensure fairness, a cut-off score is typically announced, allowing only contestants who exceed it to enter the contest, while others are…
In this paper, a multi-cluster game with high-order players is investigated. Different from the well-known multi-cluster games, the dynamics of players are taken into account in our problem. Due to the high-order dynamics of players,…
People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
This paper considers the design of fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for multi-agent games. To develop fully distributed seeking strategies, two adaptive control laws, including a node-based control law and an edge-based…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…
Multi-round competitions often double or triple the points awarded in the final round, calling it a bonus, to maximize spectators' excitement. In a two-player competition with $n$ rounds, we aim to derive the optimal bonus size to maximize…
We propose a multi-agent distributed reinforcement learning algorithm that balances between potentially conflicting short-term reward and sparse, delayed long-term reward, and learns with partial information in a dynamic environment. We…
We consider a parallel version of a classical Bayesian search problem. $k$ agents are looking for a treasure that is placed in one of the boxes indexed by $\mathbb{N}^+$ according to a known distribution $p$. The aim is to minimize the…
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
We study a novel problem of fairness in ranking aimed at minimizing the amount of individual unfairness introduced when enforcing group-fairness constraints. Our proposal is rooted in the distributional maxmin fairness theory, which uses…
In this paper, we study the problem of consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking where a network of players, abstracted as a directed graph, aim to minimize their own local cost functions non-cooperatively. Considering the…
In business, politics and life, folk wisdom encourages people to aim for above-average results, but to not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Here, we mathematically formalize and extend this folk wisdom. We model a time-limited…
We show that, in a resource allocation problem, the ex ante aggregate utility of players with cumulative-prospect-theoretic preferences can be increased over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization…
Resource allocation problems are a fundamental domain in which to evaluate the fairness properties of algorithms. The trade-offs between fairness and utilization have a long history in this domain. A recent line of work has considered…