Related papers: Evolutionary Dynamics of Variable Games in Structu…
We study the emergence of cooperation in structured populations with any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph. Using structure coefficients defined for configurations describing such arrangements of any number…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challenging issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to understand how cooperation arises. The…
In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games (MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and…
A mathematical model for behavioral changes by pair interactions (i.e. due to direct contact) of individuals is developed. Three kinds of pair interactions can be distinguished: Imitative processes, avoidance processes, and compromising…
As humans perceive and actively engage with the world, we adjust our decisions in response to shifting group dynamics and are influenced by social interactions. This study aims to identify which aspects of interaction affect…
In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff…
In social dilemmas self-interested learning agents face the choice between the societal benefit of cooperation and the immediate reward of defection. Significant evidence exists on the benefits of assortment mechanisms such as partner…
We introduce a mathematical model that combines the concepts of complex contagion with payoff-biased imitation, to describe how social behaviors spread through a population. Traditional models of social learning by imitation are based on…
We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting) evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where $N$ small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is…
Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We…
Cooperation underlies many aspects of the evolution of human and animal societies, where cooperators produce social goods to benefit others. Explaining the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals has become a major research…
In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…
Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strategies and the resource state. Here we develop an…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able to explain this phenomenon for unrealistic stateless matrix…
The paper studies the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in populations of agents who interact among themselves in Prisoner's Dilemma games and who are allowed to choose their partners. The population is then subject to…
Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be…
The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by generating random variables that determ ine the social diversity of players engaging in the…