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Motivated by the two paradoxical facts that the marginal cost of following one extra candidate is close to zero and that the majority of Twitter users choose to follow only one or two candidates, we study the Twitter follow behaviors…
Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is produced.…
When tracking user-specific online activities, each user's preference is revealed in the form of choices and comparisons. For example, a user's purchase history is a record of her choices, i.e. which item was chosen among a subset of…
Eliciting preferences from human judgements is inherently imprecise, yet most decision analysis methods force a single priority vector from pairwise comparisons, discarding the information embedded in inconsistencies. We instead leverage…
Observation of other people's choices can provide useful information in many circumstances. However, individuals may not utilize this information efficiently, i.e., they may make decision-making errors in social interactions. In this paper,…
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to…
Many networks do not live in isolation but are strongly interacting, with profound consequences on their dynamics. Here, we consider the case of two interacting social networks and, in the context of a simple model, we address the case of…
Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a…
We consider the problem of sequential evaluation, in which an evaluator observes candidates in a sequence and assigns scores to these candidates in an online, irrevocable fashion. Motivated by the psychology literature that has studied…
We study the conjugacy approximation method in the context of Bayesian ranking and selection with unknown correlations. Under the assumption of normal-inverse-Wishart prior distribution, the posterior distribution remains a…
Estimating consumer preferences is central to many problems in economics and marketing. This paper develops a flexible framework for learning individual preferences from partial ranking information by interpreting observed rankings as…
Decision making or scientific discovery pipelines such as job hiring and drug discovery often involve multiple stages: before any resource-intensive step, there is often an initial screening that uses predictions from a machine learning…
Given only aggregate choice data and limited information about how menus are distributed across the population, we describe what can be inferred robustly about the distribution of preferences (or more general decision rules). We strengthen…
The allocation of limited resources to a large number of potential candidates presents a pervasive challenge. In the context of ranking and selecting top candidates from heteroscedastic units, conventional methods often result in…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
Ranking functions that are used in decision systems often produce disparate results for different populations because of bias in the underlying data. Addressing, and compensating for, these disparate outcomes is a critical problem for fair…
We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary preferences, which govern their behavior when their vote cannot affect the election…
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…
A social choice correspondence satisfies balancedness if, for every pair of alternatives, x and y, and every pair of individuals, i and j, whenever a profile has x adjacent to but just above y for individual i while individual j has y…
We analyse optimal voting weights in two-tier voting systems. In our model, the overall population (or union) is split in groups (or member states) of different sizes. The individuals comprising the overall population constitute the first…