Related papers: Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium
We study a Stackelberg strategy subject to the evolutionary linearized micropolar fluids equations in domains with moving boundaries, considering a Nash multi-objective equilibrium (non necessarily cooperative) for the "follower players"…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg mean field games of backward-forward stochastic systems, involving a backward leader and a substantial number of forward followers. The leader initiates by providing its…
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…
This paper investigates leader-follower linear-quadratic stochastic graphon games, which consist of a single leader and a continuum of followers. The state equations of the followers interact through graphon coupling terms, with their…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
We present a resource-planning game for cyber-security of networked control systems (NCS). The NCS is assumed to be operating in closed-loop using a linear state-feedback $\mathcal{H}_2$ controller. A zero-sum, two-player Stackelberg game…
Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…
We study a model for the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) used by biological populations for choosing the time of life-history events, such as migration and breeding. In our model we accounted for both intra-species competition (early…
The multi-leader--multi-follower game (MLMFG) involves two or more leaders and followers and serves as a generalization of the Stackelberg game and the single-leader--multi-follower game (SLMFG). Although MLMFG covers wide range of…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
Emerging applications in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and (mis)information propagation involve a large population of heterogeneous users or agents in a complex network who strategically make dynamic decisions. In this work, we…