Related papers: Split-Merge Dynamics for Shapley-Fair Coalition Fo…
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
Cooperative game is a critical research area in the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Global reward game is a subclass of cooperative games, where all agents aim to maximize the global reward. Credit assignment is an important…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…
We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $\theta$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional…
Collaborative machine learning involves training high-quality models using datasets from a number of sources. To incentivize sources to share data, existing data valuation methods fairly reward each source based on its data submitted as is.…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
While significant advancements have been made in the field of fair machine learning, the majority of studies focus on scenarios where the decision model operates on a static population. In this paper, we study fairness in dynamic systems…
Distributed energy systems with prosumers require new methods for coordinating energy exchange among agents. Coalitional control provides a framework in which agents form groups to cooperatively reduce costs; however, existing bottom-up…
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
The objective is to design distributed coordination strategies for a network of agents in a cyber-physical environment. In particular, we concentrate on the rendez-vous of agents having double-integrator dynamics with the addition of a…
In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretical models useful to design marketing channels attribution mechanisms based on cooperative TU games and bankruptcy problems, respectively. First, we analyse the Sum Game, a coalitional…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral…
This paper is concerned with the problem of controlling a system of constrained dynamic subsystems in a way that balances the performance degradation of decentralized control with the practical cost of centralized control. We propose a…
With the development of sensing and communication technologies in networked cyber-physical systems (CPSs), multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)-based methodologies are integrated into the control process of physical systems and…