Related papers: Prices vs. Quantities: Robust Regulation
Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only…
This paper studies the efficiency of battery storage operations in electricity markets by comparing the social welfare gain achieved by a central planner to that of a decentralized profit-maximizing operator. The problem is formulated in a…
We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner in which firms…
Inventory management problems with periodic and controllable resets occur in the context of managing water storage in the developing world and retailing limited-time availability products. In this paper, we consider a set of sequential…
Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's…
We introduce a causal framework for designing optimal policies that satisfy fairness constraints. We take a pragmatic approach asking what we can do with an action space available to us and only with access to historical data. We propose…
Finding the optimal policy for multi-period perishable inventory systems requires solving computationally-expensive stochastic dynamic programs (DP). To avoid the difficulty of solving DP models, we propose a framework that uses an…
Robust design of autonomous systems under uncertainty is an important yet challenging problem. This work proposes a robust controller that consists of a state estimator and a tube based predictive control law. The class of linear systems…
Feedback optimization optimizes the steady state of a dynamical system by implementing optimization iterations in closed loop with the plant. It relies on online measurements and limited model information, namely, the input-output…
Affine policies (or control) are widely used as a solution approach in dynamic optimization where computing an optimal adjustable solution is usually intractable. While the worst case performance of affine policies can be significantly bad,…
Many policy problems involve designing individualized treatment allocation rules to maximize the equilibrium social welfare of interacting agents. Focusing on large-scale simultaneous decision games with strategic complementarities, we…
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…
We consider a regulator willing to drive individual choices towards increasing social welfare by providing incentives to a large population of individuals. For that purpose, we formalize and solve the problem of finding an optimal…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
In fair division problems, the notion of price of fairness measures the loss in welfare due to a fairness constraint. Prior work on the price of fairness has focused primarily on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) as the fairness…
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
Optimizing a building's energy supply design is a task with multiple competing criteria, where not only monetary but also, for example, an environmental objective shall be taken into account. Moreover, when deciding which storages and…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…