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In the realm of black-box jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs), the feasibility of constructing a narrow safety proxy, a lightweight model designed to predict the attack success rate (ASR) of adversarial prompts, remains…

Large language models have gained widespread prominence, yet their vulnerability to prompt injection and other adversarial attacks remains a critical concern. This paper argues for a security-by-design AI paradigm that proactively mitigates…

Code-capable large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly embedded into software engineering workflows where they can read, write, and execute code, raising the stakes of safety-bypass ("jailbreak") attacks beyond text-only settings.…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as analyst assistants in security operations centers (SOCs), where they ingest log and alert data to produce triage labels, incident summaries, or remediation advice. We study a structural…

As LLMs advance into autonomous agents with tool-use capabilities, they introduce security challenges that extend beyond traditional content-based LLM safety concerns. This paper introduces Sequential Tool Attack Chaining (STAC), a novel…

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak exploits that bypass safety filters and induce harmful or unethical behavior. This work presents a systematic taxonomy of existing jailbreak defenses across prompt-level,…

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on skills to package reusable capabilities through instructions, tools, and resources. High-quality skills embed expert knowledge, curated workflows, and execution constraints into agents,…

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as…

LLM-assisted defect discovery has a precision crisis: plausible-but-wrong reports overwhelm maintainers and degrade credibility for real findings. We present Refute-or-Promote, an inference-time reliability pattern combining Stratified…

Existing backdoor attacks on Large Language Model-based agents remain stateless, executing fixed behaviors confined to a single session. We propose a stateful agent backdoor that extends the attack lifecycle across multiple sessions under…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can…

Prompt injection poses a serious threat to the reliability and safety of LLM agents. Recent defenses against prompt injection, such as Instruction Hierarchy and SecAlign, have shown notable robustness against static attacks. However, to…

Powerful autonomous systems, which reason, plan, and converse using and between numerous tools and agents, are made possible by Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Models (VLMs), and new agentic AI systems, like LangChain and…

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly become key components in various AI applications, understanding their security vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of defense mechanisms is crucial. This survey examines the security challenges…

LLM agents increasingly perform end-to-end ML engineering tasks where success is judged by a single scalar test metric. This creates a structural vulnerability: an agent can increase the reported score by compromising the evaluation…

Multi-agent LLM systems are entering production -- processing documents, managing workflows, acting on behalf of users -- yet their resilience to prompt injection is still evaluated with a single binary: did the attack succeed? This leaves…

Customized Large Language Model (LLM) agents face a critical security threat from black-box instruction backdoors, where malicious behaviors are covertly injected through hidden system instructions. Although existing prompt-based defenses…

As large language models (LLMs) improve, so do their offensive applications: frontier agents now generate working exploits for under $50 in compute (Heelan, 2026). Defensive incident response (IR) agents must keep pace, but existing…

Prompt injection is listed as the number-one vulnerability class in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications that can subvert LLM guardrails, disclose sensitive data, and trigger unauthorized tool use. Developers are rapidly adopting…

We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent…