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Despite their demonstrated valuable capabilities, state-of-the-art (SOTA) widely deployed large language models (LLMs) still have the potential to cause harm to society due to the ineffectiveness of their safety filters, which can be…
Recent studies on the safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) have revealed that existing approaches often operate superficially, leaving models vulnerable to various adversarial attacks. Despite their significance, these studies…
Recent research has demonstrated that state-of-the-art LLMs and defenses remain susceptible to multi-turn jailbreak attacks. These attacks require only closed-box model access and are often easy to perform manually, posing a significant…
Sycophancy is a key behavioral risk in LLMs, yet is often treated as an isolated failure mode that occurs via a single causal mechanism. We instead propose modeling it as geometric and causal compositions of psychometric traits such as…
Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to refuse harmful instructions through safety fine-tuning. A recent attack, termed abliteration, identifies and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior,…
We evaluate language models' ability to subvert monitoring protocols via collusion. More specifically, we have two instances of a model design prompts for a policy (P) and a monitor (M) in a programming task setting. The models…
Large visual language models (LVLMs) have demonstrated excellent instruction-following capabilities, yet remain vulnerable to stealthy backdoor attacks when finetuned using contaminated data. Existing backdoor defense techniques are usually…
LLM agents are widely used as agents for customer support, content generation, and code assistance. However, they are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where adversarial inputs manipulate the model's behavior. Traditional defenses…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success in various tasks, yet their safety and the risk of generating harmful content remain pressing concerns. In this paper, we delve into the potential of In-Context Learning (ICL) to…
Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models'…
Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress, yet their safety alignment remains limited. Typically, current open-source MLLMs rely on the alignment inherited from their language module to avoid harmful…
Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm…
As advancements in large language models (LLMs) continue and the demand for personalized models increases, parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods (e.g., LoRA) will become essential due to their efficiency in reducing computation…
Safety-aligned language models often refuse cybersecurity requests whose wording resembles misuse, even when the task is authorized and defensive. This makes security evaluation ambiguous: a failed answer may reflect missing capability or…
Large models adaptation through Federated Learning (FL) addresses a wide range of use cases and is enabled by Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning techniques such as Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA). However, this distributed learning paradigm faces…
Large Language Model (LLM) alignment remains vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit unsafe responses, motivating pre-model and post-model guards. Pre-model guards audit the safety of prompts before invoking target models. However,…
Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) has become a popular solution for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) in federated settings, dramatically reducing update costs by introducing trainable low-rank matrices. However, when integrated with…
Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign…
The disastrous vulnerabilities in smart contracts sharply remind us of our ignorance: we do not know how to write code that is secure in composition with malicious code. Information flow control has long been proposed as a way to achieve…
Large language models (LLMs) excel in various tasks but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where adversaries manipulate prompts to generate harmful outputs. Examining jailbreak prompts helps uncover the shortcomings of LLMs. However,…