Related papers: Social Distancing Equilibria in Games under Conven…

We study rational synthesis problems for concurrent games with omega-regular objectives. Our model of rationality considers only pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy either a social welfare or Pareto optimality condition with respect…

In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…

Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…

This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal…

The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…

This paper studies the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games with coupling constraints, where each player optimizes its strategy depending on its local cost function and the estimated strategy…

We study the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in concurrent games played on graphs. While existence is guaranteed with safety objectives for each player, Nash equilibria need not exist when players are given arbitrary terminal-reward…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

In this paper, we study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game in Markovian framework. We show the existence of the Nash equilibrium point which is discontinuous and of bang-bang type under natural conditions. The main tool is the…

We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum…

In this work, we study stochastic non-cooperative games, where only noisy black-box function evaluations are available to estimate the cost function for each player. Since each player's cost function depends on both its own decision…

Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…

We investigate a time-inconsistent, non-Markovian finite-player game in continuous time, where each player's objective functional depends non-linearly on the expected value of the state process. As a result, the classical Bellman optimality…

We investigate an SIR model of epidemic propagation on networks in the context of mean-field games. In a real epidemic, individuals adjust their behavior depending on the epidemic level and the impact it might have on them in the future.…

This paper aims to accommodate games in which the players' dynamics are subject to un-modeled and disturbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are regarded as extended states for which observers are designed to estimate them.…

We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…

We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game we prove the existence of value and…