Related papers: Delegated Information Provision
Recommender systems aim to recommend new items to users by learning user and item representations. In practice, these representations are highly entangled as they consist of information about multiple factors, including user's interests,…
We address the fundamental problem of selection under uncertainty by modeling it from the perspective of Bayesian persuasion. In our model, a decision maker with imperfect information always selects the option with the highest expected…
Current approaches to A/B testing in networks focus on limiting interference, the concern that treatment effects can "spill over" from treatment nodes to control nodes and lead to biased causal effect estimation. Prominent methods for…
We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal…
We study a tractable two-player contest built on a truncated cubic contest success function. Its defining feature is a strategic-feedback parameter whose sign determines whether a leading player's effort lowers (suppression) or raises…
Statistical hypothesis testing serves as statistical evidence for scientific innovation. However, if the reported results are intentionally biased, hypothesis testing no longer controls the rate of false discovery. In particular, we study…
Collaborative filtering analyzes user preferences for items (e.g., books, movies, restaurants, academic papers) by exploiting the similarity patterns across users. In implicit feedback settings, all the items, including the ones that a user…
Selective labels occur when label observations are subject to a decision-making process; e.g., diagnoses that depend on the administration of laboratory tests. We study a clinically-inspired selective label problem called disparate…
Scientists often run experiments to distinguish competing theories. This requires patience, rigor, and ingenuity - there is often a large space of possible experiments one could run. But we need not comb this space by hand - if we represent…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
We consider a social choice setting with agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups, and have metric preferences over a set of alternatives. Our goal is to choose a single alternative aiming to optimize various objectives that are…
We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing…
This paper considers a half-duplex scenario where an interferer behaves according to a parametric model but the values of the model parameters are unknown. We explore the necessary number of sensing steps to gather sufficient knowledge…
We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted signals can be nonmonotone. First, if the objective is…
This paper is concerned with how to make efficient use of social information to improve recommendations. Most existing social recommender systems assume people share similar preferences with their social friends. Which, however, may not…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that…
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss,…
An information broker incentivizes consumers to share their information, while designing an information structure to shape the market segmentation. The information broker is a metaphor for an Internet platform that matches consumers with…