Related papers: Discontinuous Wealth-Gradient Transition Driving C…
The complete cooperation and the complete defection are two typical strategies considered in evolutionary games in many previous works. However, in real life, strategies of individuals are full of variety rather than only two complete ones.…
In times of plenty expectations rise, just as in times of crisis they fall. This can be mathematically described as a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy with dynamic aspiration levels, where individuals aspire to be as wealthy as their average…
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…
Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or…
In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy…
In a recent Letter [F.C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco Phys. Rev. Lett. \textbf{95}, 098104 (2005)], the scale-free networks are found to be advantageous for the emergence of cooperation. In the present work an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma…
This paper characterizes how different incentive instruments shape cooperation in a repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma with a continuum of players. A simple tit-for-tat strategy competes against unconditional defection, and the long-run outcome is…
Introducing environmental feedback into evolutionary game theory has led to the development of eco-evolutionary games, which have gained popularity due to their ability to capture the intricate interplay between the environment and…
We study a coevolutionary public goods game on a dynamic hypergraph, where an individual's payoff directly determines the number of hyperedges it can join. In the proposed mechanism, nodes adjust their participation according to the group…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not…
In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without…
Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be…
The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by generating random variables that determ ine the social diversity of players engaging in the…
We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against "defectors", or alternatively, significantly rewarding "cooperators", theoretical models typically predict a system…
Cooperation is a key driver of human social progress. Studies of the evolution of cooperation typically assume a deterministic outcome for social interactions. But in real-world social interactions, interaction outcomes are often subject to…
The emergence and survival of cooperation is one of the hardest problems still open in science. Several factors such as the existence of punishment, fluctuations in finite systems, repeated interactions and the formation of prestige may all…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of…