Related papers: On the Concept of Arithmetic Conseqeunce
The origins of proof-theoretic semantics lie in the question of what constitutes the meaning of the logical connectives and its response: the rules of inference that govern the use of the connective. However, what if we go a step further…
We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to…
The need for formal definition of the very basis of mathematics arose in the last century. The scale and complexity of mathematics, along with discovered paradoxes, revealed the danger of accumulating errors across theories. Although,…
In this paper we propose an interpretation for self-referential propositions in a "meta-model" N* of ZF. This meta-model N* is considered as an informal model of arithmetic that mathematicians often use when working with number theory.…
This paper exposes a contradiction in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). While Godel's incompleteness theorems state that a consistent system cannot prove its consistency, they do not eliminate proofs using a…
A very short proof of G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem (for set theory, second order arithmetic etc.)
This proof of Godel's first incompleteness theorem doesn't require omega-consistency, nor does it refer to codes of negated sentences as in Rosser's. It begins from where Godel's usual proof ends, and stalks it till it ends proving it.
We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $\alpha$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory…
Most discussions of G\"odel's theorems fall into one of two types: either they emphasize perceived philosophical, cultural "meanings" of the theorems, and perhaps sketch some of the ideas of the proofs, usually relating G\"odel's proofs to…
Gentzen's 1936 proof of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic was a significant result in the foundations of mathematics. We provide here a modified version of the proof, based on G\"{o}del's reformulation, and including additional details…
It is well known that the resolution method (for propositional logic) is complete. However, completeness proofs found in the literature use an argument by contradiction showing that if a set of clauses is unsatisfiable, then it must have a…
In his paper on the incompleteness theorems, G\"odel seemed to say that a direct way of constructing a formula that says of itself that it is unprovable might involve a faulty circularity. In this note, it is proved that 'direct'…
G\"odel's Dialectica interpretation was designed to obtain a relative consistency proof for Heyting arithmetic, to be used in conjunction with the double negation interpretation to obtain the consistency of Peano arithmetic. In recent…
I discuss two approaches to monotonic proof-theoretic semantics. In the first one, which I call SVA, consequence is understood in terms of existence of valid arguments. The latter involve the notions of argument structure and justification…
According to Chaitin, G\"odel once told him "it doesn't matter which paradox you use [to prove the First Incompleteness Theorem]". In this paper I will present a few infinitary paradoxes and show how to "translate" them to some undecidable…
There is an increasing interest in applying recent advances in AI to automated reasoning, as it may provide useful heuristics in reasoning over formalisms in first-order, second-order, or even meta-logics. To facilitate this research, we…
In 1931, G\"odel presented in K\"onigsberg his famous Incompleteness Theorem, stating that some true mathematical statements are unprovable. Yet, this result gives us no idea about those independent (that is, true and unprovable)…
Is it possible to encompass the full extent of the universe within a theory based on a finite set of first principles and inference rules? The r\^{o}le of observers and observations in physics theories is considered here in the light of…
It is proved that if $T$ is a $\Sigma_{n+1}$ Definable theory which is $\Sigma_n$-sound and extends $PA$, then $T$ can not prove the sentence $\Sigma_n-sound(T)$ that expresses the $\Sigma_n$-soundness of $T$. Optimality of this result is…
The reflection principle is the statement that if a sentence is provable then it is true. Reflection principles have been studied for first-order theories, but they also play an important role in propositional proof complexity. In this…