Related papers: Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other…
We study oligopolistic competition in service markets where firms offer a service to customers. The service quality of a firm - from the perspective of a customer - depends on the congestion and the charged price. A firm can set a price for…
Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…
We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accumulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system…
We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…
Today's queueing network systems are more rapidly evolving and more complex than those of even a few years ago. The goal of this paper is to study customers' behavior in an unobservable Markovian M/M/1 queue where consumers have to choose…
The existence of a (partial) market equilibrium price is proved in a complete, continuous time finite-agent market setting. The economic agents act as price takers in a fully competitive setting and maximize exponential utility from…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
In this paper, we analyze traders' behavior within both centralized exchanges (CEXs) and decentralized exchanges (DEXs), focusing on the volatility of Bitcoin prices and the trading activity of investors engaged in perpetual future…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…
We consider the use of pricing as a regulatory mechanism when an unknown number of autonomous agents compete for access to a shared resource (possibly limited in volume or capacity). In standard dynamic pricing control systems, an…
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. The presence of ties…
This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral…
In this paper, we study the problem of consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking where a network of players, abstracted as a directed graph, aim to minimize their own local cost functions non-cooperatively. Considering the…
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…
We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
Transaction selection in parallel or DAG-based distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) is a crucial challenge that directly impacts throughput, fairness, and validator incentives. In these systems, validators independently choose…